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Abstract
We investigate the welfare of intermediaries in oligopolistic markets where intermediaries offer
additional services. We exploit the unique circumstance that in the empirical setting studied,
outdoor advertising, consumers can purchase from manufacturers or intermediaries. Interme-
diaries provide additional services to the consumers and charge a margin for them. Interme-
diaries provide the following additional services: search services (information about products),
purchase-aggregation services (access to quantity discounts), and consulting services. We spec-
ify an equilibrium model and structurally estimate it using market-level data. The demand
includes consumers with costly search and channel-specific preferences. The supply includes
two distribution channels. One features bargaining about wholesale prices between manufactur-
ers and intermediaries, and downstream price competition. The other is vertically integrated.
We show how Google-search data can be used to identify the search-cost parameters. We use
the estimated model to simulate counterfactual scenarios where intermediaries do not offer ad-
ditional services. We find that the three services considered provide value to consumers, with
search playing a prominent role. Our analysis helps explain why intermediaries are ubiquitous
in modern economies despite the double marginalization.
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1 Introduction
Intermediaries play an important role in contemporary economies. In the U.S. they represent
over a third of the value added to the economy.1 They provide a wide variety of services to con-
sumers. Intermediaries often add value by transforming products (adding transportation, packaging,
or assembling services) or by providing information and consulting services about the characteris-
tics of the products sold by the manufacturers (Spulber 1996). Intermediaries improve welfare to
consumers by reducing search frictions, thus improving the coordination of the actions of consumers
and manufacturers (Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1987). When negotiating with a manufacturer, inter-
mediaries centralize transactions of multiple consumers, thus supplanting consumers’ decentralized
bargaining with the manufacturer. The resulting increase in intermediaries’ bargaining power trans-
lates into lower marginal costs for the intermediaries, which results in lower prices for the consumers.
In the absence of market power, intermediaries improve consumers’ welfare when they provide these
additional services (see Spulber 1999). However, as noted by Salinger (1988), when market power
is present intermediaries may also lead to double marginalization, whereby the product is marked
up above the marginal cost of production twice, once by the manufacturer and once again by the
intermediary.2 In such cases, intermediaries may reduce welfare. A natural question arises: What
are the welfare implications of intermediaries in oligopolistic markets where intermediaries offer
additional services to differentiate their products from the ones of the manufacturers?
There is a vast literature studying the role of intermediaries in different markets. Two major
explanations why intermediaries arise are to facilitate the matching of buyers and sellers and to
guarantee quality. There is also a large empirical literature studying specific roles of intermediaries
in many markets, such as online markets, two-sided platforms, financial markets, banking, asset
pricing, labor markets, and facilitating trade. However, there has been little empirical work to
address the central question of what are the overall welfare implications of intermediaries in the
industry when intermediaries offer additional services to differentiate their products from the ones
of the manufacturers. Yet ignoring these additional services has significant consequences on the
theoretical and empirical predictions for the determination of prices and consumer choices in these
markets.
We provide empirical estimates of the welfare of intermediation in vertical markets when inter-
mediaries simultaneously provide consulting, search, and purchase-aggregation services. There are
two major challenges to identifying the value of intermediaries in such cases. The first challenge
1U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2017). The estimate corresponds to the year 2016 using the definition by
Spulber (1996) in Table 1, whereby intermediation includes retail trade (5.9 percent of GDP for the year 2016),
wholesale trade (5.9 percent), finance and insurance (7.3 percent), business services (12.4 percent), and other services
(2.3 percent). This estimate assumes that intermediation activities in all other sectors are zero. It is a conservative
estimate.
2This is the well-known result when there are successive monopolies at two layers of production and goes back to
Lerner (1934) (for further references see, e.g., Spengler 1950 and Tirole 1988, pp. 174-6). When the manufacturer and
intermediary layers are both oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated manufacturers coexist the pres-
ence of intermediaries may increase or decrease the price of the final good (see Salinger 1988). With consumer search,
the double marginalization problem is worsened, resulting in higher wholesale and retail prices due to manufacturer’s
demand being more inelastic (Janssen and Shelegia 2015).
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arises due to the non-existence of a counterfactual scenario without intermediaries in industries
where intermediaries are present.3 It precludes evaluating the performance of the market without
intermediaries. The second challenge arises due to the difficulty of observing all the transactions
between manufacturers, intermediaries, and consumers in the industry. It may introduce a selec-
tion problem when evaluating the behavior of the unobserved participants. Recovering consumer
demand preferences in both cases requires strong assumptions about market participants.
To address these issues we collected a novel dataset with all meaningful transactions among
manufacturers and intermediaries in the Portuguese outdoor advertising industry for the year 2013.
These data allow us to exploit two unique features of the industry to quantify the welfare effects
of intermediaries. First, there are two distribution channels in the outdoor advertising industry.
Consumers may purchase the product directly from manufacturers or through intermediaries. This
feature helps us overcome the first challenge by comparing instances where the same combination of
display format—the physical products in the industry studied— and manufacturer is sold in both
distribution channels. We then use a model of conduct to compute the counterfactual value that
the consumer would have obtained had the purchase been made in a distribution channel different
from the one observed. Second, we collected market-level data directly from all the meaningful
manufactures and intermediaries in the industry. The data encompass more than 95 percent of the
volume of transactions in the industry. This feature helps us overcome the second challenge.
To quantify the value of intermediation we develop an econometric model of the industry. The
model features two distribution channels where consumers may buy advertising: the direct sales
channel (DSC), where consumers purchase directly from the manufacturers, and the vertical sales
channel (VSC), where consumers purchase using the intermediaries. On the demand side, consumers
have preferences that are specific to each distribution channel and engage in costly search. We use a
random-coefficient nested-logit model with costly search. Crucially, our model allows for consumers
to endogenously choose which channel they prefer to use, based on their idiosyncratic characteristics,
such as price sensitivity and unobserved channel-specific shocks. The latter is introduced via within-
channel correlation of the different product-level utility shocks. It captures, for example, that
some customers may have larger in-house marketing departments and therefore obtain less value
from the services provided by intermediaries to design the advertising campaign. On the supply
side, the industry consists of two vertical layers modeled using a two-stage game. In the top
layer, manufacturers produce display formats for the display of outdoor advertising (manufacturer
products) that they sell to the intermediaries at wholesale prices. Manufacturers and intermediaries
bargain over wholesale prices through Nash bargaining. We call the top layer the manufacturer game.
In the second layer, manufacturers and intermediaries sell the display formats (final products) to
the consumers, competing on prices. We call the bottom layer the retail game. The distribution
channels are represented by two types of retailers: DSC and VSC retailers. The DSC retailers are
the manufacturers who sell final products to the consumers charging DSC prices. The VSC retailers
3Alternatively, the counterfactual scenario with intermediaries is unobserved in industries where intermediaries
are not present.
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are the intermediaries who charge VSC prices to the consumers.4
We estimate the model in two steps. First, we estimate the parameters that characterize demand
without using the supply-side model. To identify the price coefficient and the heterogeneity param-
eters we rely on instruments with exclusion restrictions. To identify the search-cost parameters, we
construct additional micro moments using Google-search data. We then estimate the parameters
that characterize supply conditional on the demand estimates from the first step. To identify the
supply-side parameters we use the equilibrium conditions from the model and additional restric-
tions using the vertical structure in our empirical setting. We use the first-order conditions from
the manufacturer and retail games and assume that the manufacturer marginal costs are the same
for display formats sold to VSC retailers and consumers.
Our strategy to estimate the welfare implications of intermediaries consists of comparing circum-
stances where the same combination of display format and manufacturer is sold by DSC and VSC
retailers, and using the model to estimate the value to consumers of each of the additional services
provided by the VSC retailers. The VSC retailers provide three additional services to consumers.
They charge a margin for them. The first additional services are search services, whereby VSC re-
tailers provide information to consumers about display formats from multiple manufacturers, thus
decreasing consumers’ search costs. The second are purchase-aggregation services, whereby con-
sumers benefit from quantity discounts that VSC retailers obtain because they aggregate purchases
from multiple consumers. The third are consulting services, defined as the residual gross utility of
buying from VSC retailers relative to a DSC retailer. The market structures in the vertical layers
determine the prices and margins charged by the manufacturers and retailers.
We use the estimated equilibrium model to simulate four counterfactual scenarios to quantify
the value of intermediaries. First, we simulate the equilibrium of an industry where retailers do
not offer consulting services. Second, we simulate the equilibrium of an industry where retailers do
not offer search services. Third, we simulate the equilibrium of an industry where retailers do not
offer purchase-aggregation services. Finally, we remove simultaneously the three types of services
to evaluate the total impact on welfare due to the intermediaries.
We report the following findings: (1) removing consulting services reduces consumer surplus by
one Euro per square meter; (2) removing search services increases the overall cost of the search by
35 percent, which translates into a reduction of consumer surplus of 12 Euros per square meter; (3)
removing purchase-aggregation services increases retail prices, which translates into a reduction of
consumer surplus of two Euros per square meter; (4) removing simultaneously the three services
provided by intermediaries increases consumer surplus by 14 Euros per square meter. Overall, we
find that the presence of intermediaries increases welfare because the value of their services outweighs
the additional margin charged.
In summary, we make three main contributions. First, we combine a novel data set with a
new econometric equilibrium model to estimate consumer demand preferences and marginal costs
in the presence of intermediation, consumers’ costly search, and bargaining between manufacturers
4We use the terms intermediaries, retailers, and VSC retailers interchangeably.
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and intermediaries. The model includes consumers who have preferences that are specific to each
distribution channel and engage in costly search on the demand side, and two layers of activity with
two distribution channels on the supply side. Second, we quantify the value of intermediaries in
oligopolistic markets where intermediaries offer these additional services to differentiate their prod-
ucts from the ones of the manufacturers. Finally, from a normative perspective, our estimates show
that the presence of intermediaries in the outdoor advertising industry is welfare improving because
the benefits to consumers from the additional services provided by the intermediaries outweigh the
additional margin charged by the intermediaries.
Related Literature
We contribute to the literature that studies intermediaries. Spulber (1999) presents a compre-
hensive study of intermediation, including how intermediaries alleviate problems associated with
search costs and a detailed discussion of additional services provided by intermediaries. The role of
firms as intermediaries has been studied extensively. Articles include, e.g., Yanelle (1989), Gehrig
(1993), Rust and Hall (2003), Hagiu and Jullien (2011), Wright and Wong (2014), and Edelman and
Wright (2015). Some explanations why intermediaries arise are to facilitate the matching of buyers
and sellers as in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), to guarantee quality as in Biglaiser (1993) and
Spulber (1996), and, recently, as rent extraction (Farboodi, Jarosch, and Menzio 2017). Our case is
closest to that in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) and Spulber (1995, 1999) in that intermediaries
create value by reducing search costs and by providing additional services to the consumers.
The role of intermediaries has been studied a many markets. There is a large literature studying
the role of intermediaries in online markets (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Morton, Zettelmeyer,
and Silva-Risso 2001; Brown and Goolsbee 2002; Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith 2003; Baye, Morgan,
and Scholten 2003; Ellison and Ellison 2009; Quan and Williams 2016),5 and in financial markets,
banking, and asset pricing (e.g., James 1987, Diamond 1984, He and Krishnamurthy 2013; Brun-
nermeier and Sannikov 2014; Gavazza 2016).6 Intermediation also plays an important role in labor
markets (e.g., Stanton and Thomas 2016), agrifood chains (e.g., Lee, Gereffi, and Beauvais 2012),
facilitating trade (e.g., Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei 2011), and certifying information in markets with
adverse selection (e.g., Biglaiser 1993; Lizzeri 1999; Biglaiser, Li, Murry, and Zhou 2017). Relative
to these papers, our contribution is to estimate the welfare implications due to the presence of
intermediaries in the industry, accounting for the change in the market structure created by the
presence of the intermediaries and the additional services that intermediaries offer to consumers
which differentiates their products from the ones of the manufacturers. The literature studying out-
door advertising is non-existent. The only article that we are aware is Pereira and Ribeiro (2018);
they study capacity divestitures in this industry, not intermediation.
Our demand model is related to the literature that uses models of discrete-choice between
5Some references in the growing literature on two-sided platforms as intermediaries include, e.g., Bernard and
Jullien (2003), Evans (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2006), Galeotti and Moraga-González (2009),
Boik (2016).
6See O’Hara (1995), Freixas and Rochet (2008), and Frankel, Galli, and Giovannini (2009) for surveys.
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differentiated products with costly search.7 Our demand model is closest to De los Santos, Hortaçsu,
and Wildenbeest (2012), Honka (2014), and Moraga-González, Sándor, and Wildenbeest (2015).
They develop discrete-choice models of demand in which consumers engage in costly search with
fixed-sample size.8,9 None of these papers consider preferences specific to the distribution channel,
which is the main focus of this paper.10 We incorporate these preferences using the distribution
assumptions of the nested logit, that we embed into a random-coefficient discrete-choice demand
model with costly search.11 For the estimation of the demand, we use an adapted version of the
procedure proposed by Moraga-González, Sándor, and Wildenbeest (2015). This procedure adapts
the nested fixed-point algorithm from Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) to
account for the additional term in the choice probability introduced by the distribution-channel
preferences. It modifies the computation of the market share function in the estimation algorithm.
On the supply side, our model is related to the literature about vertical relations between man-
ufacturers and intermediaries/retailers. Our model features two layers of activity (manufacturers
and VSC retailers) and two distribution channels where consumers can purchase (VSC and DSC
retailers). The two layers of activity are related vertically as in, e.g., Brenkers and Verboven (2006),
Mortimer (2008), Bonnet and Dubois (2010), Villas-Boas (2007), and Dubois and Sæthre (2016).
The main difference between these papers and ours is that in our model manufacturers and VSC
retailers bargain over wholesale prices through Nash bargaining.12 Our bargaining model is similar
to, e.g., Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010), Grennan
(2013), Crawford, Lee, Whinston, and Yurukoglu (2018), Noton and Elberg (2018). The main dif-
ference between the bargaining models in these papers and ours is that in our model the retailers
7For studies of the formation of consideration sets with fixed-sample search see, e.g., Roberts and Lattin (1991)
and Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan (2003) in the marketing literature.
8We refer to the 2015 Working Paper by Moraga-González, Sándor, and Wildenbeest which uses a non-sequential
search model. The 2018 (and subsequent) version(s) of their paper with the same title uses a different—a sequential
search—model to the one in this paper.
9See also Goeree (2008), Ershov (2018), and Murry and Zhou (2020).
10The information structure is also different in our model relative to these papers. In our model, consumers face
uncertainty over both the price and the realization of the random shock of each product (similar to Pires 2016), while
in De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest (2012) consumers only face uncertainty about the price of the product
(not about the realization of the random shock) and in Moraga-González, Sándor, and Wildenbeest (2015) consumers
only face uncertainty about the realization of the random shock (not about the price of the product).
11For other recent applications of the random-coefficient nested-logit model see, e.g., Grennan (2013), Ciliberto
and Williams (2014), and Miller and Weinberg (2017). None of these papers incorporate costly search.
12Nash bargaining is a way to generate quantity discounts or non-linear pricing schemes. In a Nash bargaining
model, the larger the value of the bargaining parameter and the larger the value of the outside option, the better
the terms a party can negotiate. In our setting, when negotiating with a VSC retailer, the outside option of a
manufacturer is the profit if its products are not sold by the VSC retailer. For a given manufacturer, the larger
is the VSC retailer that is negotiating with, the smaller is the value of its outside option and the smaller is the
wholesale price it is willing to charge the VSC retailer. There there are no volumes/quantities explicitly involved in
our bargaining game. However, the volumes/quantities define how large is the VSC retailer and, thus, determine its
outside option in the Nash bargaining game. The bargaining model does not generate quantity discounts per se. It
rather rationalizes the observed quantity discounts in the setting through larger estimated outside options for larger
VSC retailers. The quantity discounts between manufacturers and VSC retailers are then partially transferred to the
consumers by the VSC retailers. There is a large literature studying quantity discounts and nonlinear pricing (see,
e.g., Miravete 2002; Busse and Rysman 2005; McManus 2007; Cohen 2008; Chu, Leslie, and Sorensen 2011; Miravete
and Röller 2004a; Miravete and Röller 2004b; Nevo, Turner, and Williams 2016; Donna and Pires 2016).
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in both distribution channels can sell their products to the consumers. Such sales occur in our
model after the bargaining process, where prices are set to consumers through standard Bertrand
competition. Thus, the instruments and identifying assumptions to recover equilibrium margins
as a function of the demand primitives, and bargaining power of VSC retailers and manufacturers
are different. Similar to Grennan (2013), we do not estimate all bargaining and cost parameters
because we do not have enough information. Similar to our paper, the model in Donna, Pereira,
Trindade, and Yoshida (2021, DPTY) features both direct-to-consumer sales by manufacturers, and
bargaining between manufacturers and retailers. The main focus of DPTY, however, is the supply
side. The central feature in the model of DPTY is that a direct-to-consumer channel enhances the
manufacturer’s bargaining power, which can harm retail consumers. In contrast, our main focus
here is the demand side to estimate the value of intermediaries to consumers.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the industry, the data,
and presents stylized facts about the industry. Section 3 presents the model. Sections 4 and 5
discuss identification and estimation of the demand and supply, respectively. Section 6 presents
the estimation results. The welfare analysis is performed in Section 7. Section 8 presents the
concluding remarks. Appendix A extends the search model to allow for unobserved search-cost
heterogeneity. Robustness analysis, extensions, and details about the data and the model are in the
Online Appendix.
2 Portuguese Outdoor Advertising Industry
2.1 Industry Overview
Agents. There are three main economic agents in the Portuguese outdoor advertising industry:
manufacturers, retailers, and consumers. A manufacturer, also called media owner, is a firm that
installs and commercially exploits equipment for the display of outdoor advertising. Examples in-
clude J.C. Decaux Group, Cemusa, and Mop. A retailer, also called media group, is an intermediary
that buys advertising from the manufacturer on behalf of the consumer. Examples include Omni-
com Media Group, WPP Plc., and Power Media Group Inc. Retailers offer consumers additional
services such as consulting services, advertising planning campaigns, and information about the
display formats of several manufacturers.13 All manufacturers and retailers operate in the same
geographic market. This feature follows from Portugal being a small country, where the population
is concentrated along the coast.14 A consumer, also called advertiser, is a firm that demands ad-
vertising to promote its products. Consumers in this industry are firms that buy exposure in the
manufacturer’s advertisement network.15 For example, consumers buy 200 panels of 2 m2 panels
(called faces) distributed in the national network of J.C. Decaux Group. They cannot choose, how-
13A retailer is a set of media agencies and a central purchasing agency with a common owner. Media agencies plan
and buy advertising campaigns. The central purchasing agency aggregates purchases of media agencies and places
orders to the manufacturers. A retailer might own several media agencies either because they specialize in different
industries or to avoid confidentiality issues with advertisers.
14In 2014, in a merger review case on the outdoor advertising industry—case Ccent. 15/2014 JCDecaux/Cemusa—
the Portuguese Competition Authority considered that the geographic market for this industry is Portugal. We follow
that same approach in this paper.
15The advertisement network refers to the location of the display formats of the manufacturers.
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ever, specific 2 m2 panels located at a particular place. Most of the purchases are in the national
network, which is the focus of this paper. The exposition is similar across manufacturers.
Vertical Relations. Consumers make 85 percent of their purchases from the retailers and the
remaining 15 percent directly from the manufacturers (Table 1). There are two active distribution
channels. In the Vertical Sales Channel (VSC), consumers purchase manufacturers’ display formats
through the intermediation of retailers. In the Direct Sales Channel (DSC), consumers purchase
manufacturers’ display formats directly from the manufacturers. We refer the manufacturers that
sell directly to consumers in the DSC as DSC retailers and to the retailers in the VSC as VSC
retailers. We refer to the price charged to the consumers by the DSC retailers (VSC retailers)
as DSC price (VSC price or retail price). Figure 1 displays the vertical relations in the industry.
Advertisers’ choice of the distribution channel is determined by their advertising needs, which may
or may not be related to the size of their firm. The two channels offer different services. The direct
channel offers a basic service. The intermediated channel offers the basic service plus additional
services, such as consulting. Firms that advertise only occasionally or that make simple campaigns
typically use the direct channel. Advertisers that advertise frequently or make elaborate campaigns,
that require complex planning, typically use the intermediated channel.
Retailers’ Services. Retailers provide three main services to the consumers in this industry.
First, they provide consulting services. Retailers assist consumers with their advertisement cam-
paigns by helping them to make decisions such as the type and number of display formats to buy
(i.e., type and the total number of panels) and the duration of the advertising campaign. Second,
retailers provide purchase-aggregation services to the consumers. Retailers negotiate rebate scales
with manufacturers. Retailers aggregate the purchases from multiple consumers when buying from
the manufacturers. These discounts are partially transferred to the consumers (Subsection 2.3).
Retailers aggregate the purchases of many advertisers. It gives retailers larger bargaining power
to negotiate with the manufacturers, enabling them to obtain lower prices per unit relative to the
consumers (i.e., quantity discounts as defined in Subsection 2.3). A retailer attains a larger volume
of purchases, and thereby of rebate levels, than individual advertisers. Buying through a retailer
therefore gives consumers access to larger rebate opportunities than they could obtain by them-
selves. Finally, retailers provide search services to consumers. Retailers provide information about
the prices available for the display formats of multiple manufacturers in the industry. Retailers col-
lect this information once per period (e.g., month) and use it for the orders of multiple consumers.
Retailers benefit from economies of scale relative to the consumers (we document this in Subsection
2.3). Retailers have more experience than consumers collecting this information. It allows them to
do it more efficiently (i.e., lower search costs due to better search technology).
Display Formats. There are three main display formats: 2 m2 panels (mupis), seniores, and
(iii) others. Panels of 2 m2 include city information panels, bus shelters, kiosks, etc. A senior is
an advertising panel with an area between 8 and 24 m2. The last category, others, encompasses
transports and special formats. A transport includes panels on moving vehicles (e.g., buses, trains,
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taxis) or transport hubs (e.g., airports, railway’s stations, subways’ stations). Finally, a special
format is large panel typically made by special request to be displayed, e.g., on buildings’ gables.
We define a product as a combination of display format, manufacturer, and retailer. Examples of
products are: J.C. Decaux Group’s 2 m2 panels sold by Havas Media Group, Cemusa’s seniors sold
by WPP Plc., and J.C. Decaux Group’s 2 m2 panels sold directly by J.C. Decaux Group.
See Online Appendix B.1 for a discussion about product differentiation, payment schedules,
productive capacity, and market concentration.
2.2 Data
The Data Set. The data were obtained from various sources. We obtained administrative data
from all the meaningful manufactures and retailers in the industry for the year 2013 aggregated at
the monthly market level. By meaningful we mean that our data encompass more than 95 percent
of the volume of transactions in the industry. We consider three display formats: 2 m2 panel,
senior, and an additional category aggregating the remaining formats that have negligible weight
individually. We consider four manufacturers: the three main manufacturers in the industry (J.C.
Decaux Group, Cemusa, and Mop) and an additional manufacturer that aggregates the smaller
manufacturers. We consider nine retailers: the five main VSC retailers in the industry (Omnicom
Media Group, WPP Plc., Power Media Group Inc., Havas Media Group, and Interpublic Group
of Companies), one additional VSC retailer that aggregates the smaller VSC retailers, and three
DSC retailers representing the direct sales of each of the three larger manufacturers (J.C. Decaux
Group, Cemusa, and Mop). There are no direct sales from the other manufacturers. Henceforth, for
confidentiality reasons, we refer to the three main manufacturers as m1, m2, and m3, not necessarily







by the same order as the three main manufacturers, to the five main VSC retailers as rv4 , . . . , r
v
8 ,
not necessarily in the order above, and to the additional VSC retailer as rv9 . Figure 1 summarizes
this information. See Online Appendix B.2.1 for details about the procedures to clean the data.
Characteristics of the manufacturers and retailers were collected by inspecting their websites.
Google-search data—used to construct micro moment conditions to identify the search-cost param-
eters on the demand side—were obtained from Google Trends Portugal. See Online Appendix B.2.2
for details.
In each month and for each triplet of display format, manufacturer, and retailer we observe: the
total sales, measured in Euros; the total quantity of advertising sold, measured in advertising faces
and square meters; the wholesale prices charged from the manufacturers to the retailers, measured
in Euros; the commissions, fees, and quantity discounts paid to the manufacturers, measured in
Euros; and the installed capacity, measured in advertising faces. We also observe characteristics for
each manufacturer and retailer, such as the number of offices.
Products. We define a product as a combination of display format, manufacturer, and retailer
(including DSC and VSC retailers). Panel A in Table 1 shows the percentage of sales to consumers
by each combination of manufacturer-retailer in the sample. Panel B in Table 1 shows the percentage
of sales of each of the 57 inside products in the sample. The total number of inside products in the
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sample is 57. This number is lower than the total possible products in the market, 81.16 This feature
is because some VSC retailers only sell a subset of display formats from certain manufacturers (the
subset with which they contracted; e.g., Panel B in Table 1 shows that retailer rv8 does not sell 2
m2 panels manufactured by m3) and some DSC retailers do not sell certain display formats directly
to consumers (e.g., Panel B in Table 1 shows that retailer rd1 , which corresponds to manufacturer
m1 selling directly to consumers, does not sell seniors in the DSC). All VSC retailers contract with
all of the three largest manufacturers. This feature rules out the possibility that some retailers do
not negotiate with some of the manufacturers due to selection based on unobservables.
Wholesale and Retail Prices in the VSC. Table 2 reports summary statistics on wholesale and
VSC prices for each display format. VSC prices, i.e., retail prices, are higher than wholesale prices.
Panel B shows large differences in prices across both manufacturers and retailers holding constant
the display format. These price differences and the differences in the observed market shares suggest
that differentiation is important. Table A1 in the Online Appendix compares wholesale and retail
prices in the VSC by manufacturer and by retailer for the display format 2 m2 panel. There are
substantial differences in VSC and wholesale prices across VSC retailers holding constant the display
format and the manufacturer. For example, retailer rv9 is the most expensive retailer, including DSC
retailers, for 2 m2 panels manufactured by m2, but the cheapest retailer for seniors manufactured
by m2. Tables 2 and A1 show that differences in wholesale and VSC prices are small. They suggest
that most of the differences in VSC prices are explained by differences in wholesale prices. The
profit margins of VSC retailers are small.
Sales to Consumers in the VSC and DSC. Panel A in Table 1 shows that 85.2 percent of the
sales to consumers are made through VSC retailers The remaining 14.8 percent of the sales are made
through DSC retailers. There is substantial variation across months in the market shares of VSC
and DSC sales (see Figure 2 and Online Appendix B.3.2). Monthly sales in the DSC range between
13.9 and 42.6 percent (Figure 2). DSC prices are higher than wholesale prices holding constant the
manufacturer and the display format. It is the result of manufacturers offering quantity discounts
to retailers. It suggests that manufacturers use direct sales as a price discrimination mechanism in
the DSC.
Table 3 shows that the median price paid by consumers is higher in the DSC than in the VSC.
Occasionally, prices in the DSC are lower than in the VSC (e.g., senior manufactured by m1 in Panel
B in Table 3). There are two effects at play. On the one hand, VSC retailers aggregate the purchases
of several consumers. It allows them to obtain lower prices per unit (due to quantity discounts)
when negotiating with the manufacturers (see Subsection 2.3). This effect lowers VSC prices and
increases VSC price dispersion relative to the DSC prices.17 On the other hand, VSC retailers offer
16From Table 1, the total possible number of products to the consumers in the market is:
(3 Display Formats) × (4 Manufacturers) × (6 VSC Retailers)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
VSC




17Conditional on quantity discounts, however, the distribution of prices in the VSC is less disperse than in the
DSC, as discussed on page 10.
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additional services to the consumers that are not offered by DSC retailers. VSC retailers charge a
price for the additional services. This effect increases VSC relative to DSC prices.
Market Shares. We use the described data to build a data set of products sold in the DSC and
VSC for each month of the year 2013 and their characteristics. Market shares are defined by dividing
volume sales by the total potential sales in a given month. These potential sales (or market size) were
assumed to be twenty percent greater than the maximum observed total monthly sales of the year
2013. The market share of the outside good was defined as the difference between one and the sum
of the market shares of the inside goods in each month. The outside good can be conceptualized as
including goods outside the sample (e.g., special request panels), outdoor advertising sold by other
manufacturers and retailers (e.g., small manufacturers and retailers that operate locally), and not
buying outdoor advertising. An observation in this data set represents a market share of a product
as defined above in a given month. We define a market as a month. We consider 12 markets, one
for each month of the year.
2.3 Three Stylized Facts
The Portuguese outdoor advertising industry is characterized by quantity discounts in the VSC,
seasonal effects and large variation in the market shares, and substantial price dispersion conditional
on quantity discounts and seasonal effects.
Quantity Discounts in the VSC. Consumers’ purchases exhibit quantity discounts in the VSC
but not in the DSC. By quantity discounts we mean that the price paid per square meter decreases
with the volume purchased. Table 4 presents evidence about quantity discounts. It displays OLS
regressions of the price paid by consumers per square meter of advertising on the total volume
of advertising in a logarithmic scale, denoted by “Log(m2).” Column 1 shows that the price paid
by consumers per square meter of advertising decreases nonlinearly with the volume purchased of
advertising. In column 2 we include an interaction between “Log(m2)” and “VSC.” The variable
“VSC” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the consumer performed the purchase through a VSC
retailer and 0 if the consumer performed the purchase through a DSC retailer. The interaction
term is negative and statistically different from zero while the coefficient on “Log(m2)” is no longer
statistically different from zero. The purchases made by consumers in the VSC exhibit quantity
discounts while the ones made in the DSC do not. Columns 3 and 4 show similar results when we
include fixed effects for manufacturers, retailers, display formats, and months. Columns 2 and 4
show that the effect of quantity discounts is only present in the VSC.18
Seasonalities and Monthly Variation. Seasonal variations are substantial. The total volume
purchased increases during the summer. See Online Appendix B.3.2 for details. For the estimation,
we use monthly indicator variables to account for these seasonal effects.
Price Dispersion and Returns to Consumer Search. There is substantial price dispersion: (i)
across retailers holding constant the display format (product heterogeneity), the month of the year
18We obtain similar results by regressing the price paid by consumers per square meter using a polynomial function
of square meters of advertising purchased.
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(seasonal effects), and the volume percentile (quantity discounts); and (ii) across months holding
constant the display format, the manufacturer, the retailer, and the volume percentile. This feature
indicates that the returns to consumers’ search (for product’s prices) are high in this market.
Figure 3 shows that price dispersion is lower in the VSC than in the DSC conditional on quantity
discounts. The top panel displays the distribution of the coefficient of variation of prices (CV)
holding constant the display format, the month, and the volume percentile. That is, each CV is
computed within the unit of analysis in the tuple (Display Format,Month,Volume Percentile).19
The mean CV is 45 percent (pooling together sales in the VSC and DSC). The mean CV for sales
made in the VSC is 43 percent and for sales made in the DSC is 54 percent. This result indicates
that returns to consumers’ search for product’s prices vary substantially by distribution channel.20
The bottom panel in Figure 3 shows that the empirical CDF for sales made in the DSC first-
order stochastically dominates the one for sales made in the VSC. It indicates that consumers who
buy in the VSC face lower price dispersion consistently. Buying in the VSC can provide substantial
returns to consumers with large search costs in this market. Figure 3 is consistent with VSC
retailers providing search services to the consumers. The covariates included in the model explain
over 90 percent of the price variation in the data (adjusted R2 = 0.927 of regressing prices on
covariates). We interpret this fact as products being relatively homogeneous after accounting for
these covariates and in favor of using a random-coefficient demand model with costly search to
account for the remaining unobserved product heterogeneity.
3 Model
3.1 Consumers
We use a random-coefficient nested-logit model with costly search. Consumers know the products
available in each market but do not know the price nor the realization of the random shock associated
with each product. To learn this information consumers engage in costly search for retailers.
Consumer’s choice is a two-step process. In the first step, the consumer chooses the subset
of retailers to search. After searching for a retailer, the consumer learns the information of the
products sold by that retailer, prices and realizations of the random shocks. This step determines the
consideration set of each consumer type. The consideration set is given by the subset of products sold
by all the retailers searched and the outside product. In the second step, after observing the prices
and random shocks of the products sold by the retailers searched, the consumer chooses the product
to purchase; that is, the consumer chooses among the subset of products from the retailers searched.
19We obtain similar results using other measures of price dispersion such as percentile differences (e.g., the difference
between the 95th and the 5th price percentiles, the difference between the 90th and the 10th price percentiles, etc.),
range, and price gap. Substantial price variation is explained by quantity discounts. Ignoring quantity discounts one
would incorrectly conclude that the price distribution is more disperse for sales made in the VSC than for sales made
in the DSC (bottom panel in Figure 2).
20VSC retailers offer additional services to consumers (e.g., consulting services, advertising planning campaigns,
information about the products of all manufacturers, etc.) that are not offered by DSC retailers. Figure A1 in the
Online Appendix shows similar patterns to the ones in Figure 3 when we measure price dispersion across months
holding constant the display format, the manufacturer, the retailer, and the volume percentile (i.e., identical products
sold by the same seller holding constant the volume percentile). The additional services provided by VSC retailers
shift the distribution of prices charged by each VSC retailer but do not affect price dispersion in the market.
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This step is a standard discrete-choice problem similar to, e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)
and Nevo (2001). The difference is that the choice set for each consumer is endogenously determined
in the first step. We refer to the first step as the search step and the second step as the purchase
step.
We assume that there are t = 1, . . . , T markets, each with a continuum of rational, utility-
maximizing consumers. Consumers have different preferences for different products. A market
is defined as a month. In each market t, there are Jt horizontally differentiated and mutually
exclusive inside products, indexed by j = 1, . . . , Jt. We index with j = 0 the outside product.
It allows consumers not to purchase any of the inside products. In each market, each consumer
purchases one inside product or the outside product.
Step 2: Purchase step. Consider consumer i who searched Ri retailers in the search step in
market t.21 The indirect utility of consumer i for inside product j in market t, denoted by Uijt, is:








t + ξjt + ε̂ijt, (1)
j ∈ ĴtRi = {ĵ : ĵ ∈ Jt is sold by retailer r ∈ Ri} ∪ {0}, t = 1, . . . , T,
where Ri denotes the subset of retailers searched by consumer i in market t; ĴtRi is the consideration
set of consumer i, given by the subset of products sold by all the retailers searched and the outside
product; pjt is the price of product j in market t; xjt is a S-dimensional row-vector of observable




r , and τ
D
t capture the preferences for display
format d, manufacturer m, retailer r, and monthly seasonal effects in market t, using fixed dummy
variables for display format, manufacturer, retailer, and monthly seasonal effects, respectively; ξjt is
the valuation of unobserved, by the econometrician, characteristics of product j in market t; ε̂ijt is
a stochastic term described below;22 αi are individual-specific parameters that capture consumers’
preferences for price, described below; and β is a S-dimensional vector of parameters. In each market
t, we normalize the characteristics of the outside product, j = 0, such that p0t = x0t = τ
D
0 = ξ0t = 0








t + ξĵt the indirect utility of consumer
i for product ĵ ∈ ĴtRi in market t, net of the stochastic term, ε̂ijt. We model the distribution of
consumers’ preferences for price as αi = α + σννi with νi ∼ Pν(νi) = N (0, 1), where α and σν are
parameters, νi captures unobserved, by the econometrician, individual characteristics, and Pν(·) is a
parametric distribution assumed to be a standardized Normal, N (0, 1), for the estimation. Denote








t + ξĵt the mean utility for product ĵ in market t; that
is, the portion of the utility that is constant across consumer types. Then U iĵt = δĵt − σννipĵt for
all i, ĵ, and t.
Consumers have preferences that are specific to each distribution channel (or retailer type) and
the outside product. We capture it by decomposing the stochastic term, ε̂ijt, using the distributional
assumptions of the nested-logit with a factor structure: ε̂ijt = ζigt + (1 − λ)εijt. The subindex
21The set of searched retailers is market specific. To simplify the notation, we omit the market subscript and we
refer to the set of searched retailers as Ri instead of Rit.
22Heterogeneity in the value to consumers within product (for example, due to the specific location of the billboard)
is of horizontal nature (for example, some consumers may prefer space near a school while others may prefer it close
to a highway). This feature is captured in our model by ε̂ijt.
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g ∈ {0, 1, 2} define three groups (or nests) of nonoverlapping products for the outside product
(denoted by g = 0, with only one product), the products sold by the DSC retailers (denoted by
g = 1), and the products sold by the VSC retailers (denoted by g = 2). The random variable
ζigt has a unique distribution such that ε̂ijt is extreme value (Cardell 1997). The parameter λ is a
nesting parameter such that 0 ≤ λ < 1. A larger value of λ corresponds to a greater correlation
in preferences for products in the same distribution channel and the outside product. A larger
value of λ is therefore associated with less substitution between products in different distribution
channels and the outside product. When λ = 0 the model in the second step collapses to a standard
random-coefficient mixed-logit model (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; Nevo 2001) with no
preference heterogeneity for distribution channels or the outside product but with an endogenous
choice set selection from the search step.
For the estimation, it is convenient to write the nested-logit choice probability as the product
of two standard logit probabilities. Denote by Piĵt|Ri the nested-logit probability that individual i
chooses product ĵ in period t conditional on the searched retailers, Ri. Then:
23
Piĵt|Ri
















i = 1, . . . , It, ĵ ∈ (ĝ ∩ ĴtRi), ĝ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, t = 1, . . . , T,
where the first equality follows from the law of total probability; Piĵt|ĝRi is the conditional probability
of choosing product ĵ given that the product is in group ĝ and in the consideration set, ĴtRi ; Piĝt|Ri
is the marginal conditional probability of choosing a product in group ĝ given that the product
is in the consideration set ĴtRi ; the last equality follows from the nested-logit structure using the
decomposition into two standard logit probabilities; and the terms IiĝRi and IĝRi are inclusive values
given in Online Appendix C.2.
Step 1: Search step. Consumers know the products available in each market but do not know
the price, pjt, or the realization of the random shocks, ε̂ijt, associated with each inside product.
Before searching consumers only know the distributions of the prices, F̃p(p), and random shocks,
ε̂ijt.
24 Consumers can purchase an inside product only if they collect information about its price
and random shock. They can engage in costly search to collect this information. A consumer who
does not search can only buy the outside product. Let SCRi be the cost of consumers of collecting
information about prices and random shocks of retailer Ri.
25 We assume that if consumers search a
retailer, they collect information about all the products sold by that retailer. Our search costs are
therefore the cost of searching for a retailer, not the cost of searching for a product. VSC retailers
sell the products from multiple manufacturers. Searching for a VSC retailer allows consumers to
collect information about a larger set of products than searching for a DSC retailer. It allows us to
23See Online Appendix C.2 for details.
24See page 14 and footnote 28 for details.
25The search cost includes the time spent to find and collect information about retailers, and processing costs (e.g.,
investigating in the retailer’s webpage). Our definition of search costs encompasses the cost of including a product
at the purchase occasion and an evaluation cost (Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990).
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rationalize the lower price dispersion observed in the VSC relative to the DSC.
We consider a fixed-sample stochastic search process. First, consumers commit to searching a
fixed number of retailers. The number could be zero, in which case the consumer buys the outside
product in the purchase step. This commitment is done before beginning the search. The search
finishes after consumers searched all the retailers they committed to even if they obtain a favorable
search outcome early on.26 The expected net value for consumer i of searching a subset of retailers
Ri in market t, denoted by VtRi , is the difference between the expected maximum utility of buying
















 dF̃pt(p) + γ̂ − SCRi + ε̃itRi , (3)
where F̃p(p) is the distribution of inside products’ prices known by the consumers in market t,
described below; SCRi is the cost of searching the subset of retailers Ri, described below; ε̃itRi is a
random shock to the subset of searched retailers, described below; the equality in the second line
follows from the expected maximum utility of the nested-logit model conditional on the searched
retailers; γ̂ = 0.5772 is the Euler’s constant; and the term IĝRi is the inclusive value of the set of
products from the searched retailers that belong to subset ĝ excluding the outside product, given
in Online Appendix C.3.
Before searching, consumers only know the distribution of prices of the inside products available
in market t, F̃p(p). We assume that consumers know the true empirical distribution of prices
disaggregated by distribution channel (or type of retailer). This assumption is equivalent to say
that consumers know two distributions of prices: the distribution of prices for the DSC retailers and
the distribution of prices for the VSC retailers. Consumers learn the prices of the set of products
sold by each retailer when they search for such retailer.28 We model the cost of searching a subset
Ri of retailers in t, SCRi , as:
SCRi = S̄ × {#mr1}+ · · ·+ S̄ × {#mrQ}, (4)
where Ri = {r1, . . . , rQ} is the subset of searched retailers, rq with q = 1, . . . , Q, each of the searched
retailers in t, S̄ is a parameter, and {#mrq} denotes the number of different manufacturer for which
rq has product availability in market t. Conditional on selling products in t, {#mrqt} = 1 for DSC
retailers, and {#mrqt} ≥ 1 for VSC retailers. In words, equation (4) says that consumers pay a
search cost S̄ for each manufacturer sold by the retailer searched.
26In our model, consumers are firms demanding advertisement. The decision of how many retailers to contact is
typically made ex ante. The fixed-sample search assumption in our model is intended to capture such practice.
27See Online Appendix C.3 for details.
28We have also performed the analysis using the following information structures for F̃p(p). (i) Consumers only know
the overall distribution of prices. That is, consumers only know one distribution with the prices for all the products
in the market. (ii) Consumers know the distribution of each product in the market disaggregated by distribution
channel and by product. That is, consumers know 57 distribution of prices, where the number 57 corresponds to the
number of inside products in the sample (see footnote 16). Under the information structure in (i), consumers have
less information than in the benchmark. Under the information structure in (ii), consumers have more information
than in the benchmark. We obtained similar results in terms of the welfare analysis under the benchmark, (i), and
(ii). Models 2 and 3 in Table A2 in the Online Appendix shows the results under (i) and (ii), respectively. For the
estimation and for each information structure in the benchmark, (i), and (ii), we pool the relevant prices across all
markets to compute the empirical distribution observed by the consumers before searching, F̃p(p).
14
We model the search problem of the consumer from a stochastic point of view. We add a random
shock to the subset of searched retailers, ε̃itRi in equation (3), as in De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and
Wildenbeest (2012) and Moraga-González, Sándor, and Wildenbeest (2015). We do this for two
reasons. First, the variance of the shock can be interpreted as measuring the degree of heterogeneity
in the errors that consumers make when evaluating the net expected gain of a subset of retailers
(De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest 2012). Alternatively, by positing the random shock
directly in the search-cost equation, one can interpret it as a shock to the total cost of searching a
subset of retailers. Second, solving for a consumer’s optimal search strategy is a difficult problem.
The consumer must simultaneously choose among a set of ranked stochastic options. Each choice is
costly and only the best-realized option is exercised. When there are many alternatives available in
the market finding the optimal choice set is extremely complex because there are many choice sets
to be evaluated. By approaching this problem from a stochastic perspective, we smooth the choice
set probabilities of choosing a given subset of retailers. We therefore do not need to solve the search
problem of every consumer. Instead, we compute the probability that a given subset of retailers is
searched by a consumer. We assume that the term ε̃itRi is drawn i.i.d. (across individuals, markets,
and sets of retailers) from a type I extreme value distribution with location parameter µε̃ = 0 and
scale parameter σε̃ > 0.
29 Denote by Ψ ≡ (S̄, σε̃) the vector of search-cost parameters.
Consumer i chooses the subset of searched retailers, Ri, that maximizes the expected net benefit
of searching, VtRi . The probability that consumer i finds optimal to sample the subset of retailers












where V tRi ≡ VtRi − ε̃itRi , is the expected value of searching a subset of retailers Ri net of the shock
ε̃itRi , with VtRi given by equation (3); Λ is the powerset of all retailers; and the equality follows the
well-known logit choice probability.
Choice Probabilities and Market Shares. The unconditional choice probability of consumer
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29The scale parameter, σε̃, is identified because we have already normalized the scale of the ordinal utility of
the consumer. The latter was done by normalizing the scale parameter of the stochastic term ε̂ijt in equation (1)
to σε̂ = 1. We make the assumption that the shocks are i.i.d. across consideration sets of retailers due to the
nature of our data that is aggregated at the market level. In Appendix A we extend the search model to allow for
unobserved search-cost heterogeneity. may counterfactuals. The cumulative distribution function for the shocks ε̃itRi





i = 1, . . . , It, j ∈ Jt, g ∈ {0, 1, 2}, t = 1, . . . , T,
where the equality in (6a) follows from the law of total probability; the equality in (6b) follows from
equation (2a); and the equality in (6c) follows by replacing the expressions for Piĵt|ĝRi and Piĝt|Ri
by equation (2b) (purchase step), and by replacing the expression for PR′i by equation (5) (search
step).
Intuitively, equation (6) says that the unconditional probability that consumer type i chooses
product j in market t is the weighted average of the conditional choice probability of each consid-
eration set, where the weight of each consideration set is given by the unconditional probability
that the consumer finds it optimal to sample that subset of retailers, PR′i . This weighted average of
probabilities (equation 6a) can be written as the product of three standard logit formulas that are
linked (equation 6c): (i) the conditional probability of choosing product j given that it belongs to
group g and is sold by the subset of searched retailers Ri (Pijt|gR′i); (ii) the conditional probability
of choosing a product in group g given that it is sold by the subset of searched retailers (Pigt|R′i);
and (iii) the unconditional probability that the consumer finds optimal to sample the subset of
retailers (PR′i). The probabilities in (i) and (ii) are linked through the inclusive value IigRi . This
inclusive value is the expected utility of consumer i from choosing a product among the ones in
nest g. When λ = 0, the probabilities in (i) and (ii) collapse to a standard random-coefficient logit
model. Similarly, these probabilities are linked to the probability in (iii) through the consideration
sets. These subsets of retailers, R′i, enter into the value V tR′i , and in the inclusive values IigR′i and
IgR′i . The parameters in the search costs, SCitR′i , determine the probability that the consumer finds
it optimal to search R′i retailers. When all search costs are zero, the consumer searches all retail-
ers with probability one and PR′i = 0 for any other subset R
′
i of retailers. Equation (6) therefore
collapses to Pijt = Pijt|g × Pigt, a standard random-coefficient nested-logit model without search.
30
The market share function for product j in market t, denoted by sjt, is obtained by integrating





where Pijt is given by equation (6); and Pν(·) is a parametric distribution assumed to be a stan-
dardized Normal, N (0, 1), for the estimation.
In Appendix A, we generalize the search model by allowing correlation between the stochastic
shocks to the consideration sets of retailers, Ri.
3.2 Manufacturers and Retailers
The supply-side model has two main characteristics. First, the industry consists of two layers of
activity that are related vertically. Second, there are two distribution channels (or retailers’ types),
30If the nesting, price heterogeneity, and search-cost parameters equal zero (i.e., if λ = σν = S̄t = s
D
rt = 0 for all





ĵt in equation (6). Similarly,
our random-coefficient nested-logit model with search collapses to the nested-logit model if σν = S̄t = s
D
rt = 0 for all
D, t.
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where consumers can buy advertising: the direct sales channel (DSC) and the vertical sales channel
(VSC). The game unfolds in two stages. In the first stage, manufacturers and VSC retailers bargain
over wholesale prices through Nash bargaining). In the second stage, VSC and DSC retailers set
retail prices to consumers through Bertrand competition.
Consider an industry with a two-layered vertical structure, the manufacturer layer and the
retail layer. In the manufacturer layer, multi-product firms, called manufacturers, produce basic
production factors, called display formats, that they sell either to the VSC retailers or directly to
the consumers if they have a DSC channel. A production factor (display format) from a given
manufacturer sold to different VSC retailers generates different manufacturer products. In the retail
layer, multi-product firms, called VSC retailers, combine manufacturer products with their retail
production factors to produce retail products, also called display formats, that they sell to final
consumers. Retailers have free access to all the information regarding the products that they carry
in their portfolios.
There are d = 1, . . . ,D basic production factors, m = m1, . . . ,mM manufacturers, and r =
r1, . . . , rR retailers. Each manufacturer may sell their product through one of the retailers or
directly to the final consumer. There are potentially J = D ×M× (R+ 1) final products.31 Not
all the manufacturers have a DSC channel. It is therefore convenient to divide them into pure
manufacturers (those who sell only in the VSC) and hybrid manufacturers (those who sell in both
the VSC and DSC). Denote by ΩVm the set of products that manufacturer m sells to VSC retailers
and by ΩDm the set of products that manufacturer m sells to consumers directly. Denote by Ωr
the set of products that retailer r sells to the final consumers. Denote by ωj the wholesale price
of manufacturer product j, by ω the J × 1 vector of manufacturer wholesale prices, by cmj the
marginal cost of manufacturer product j, and by cm the J × 1 vector of manufacturer marginal
costs. Denote by pj the price of retail product j, by p the J × 1 vector of retail prices, by c
r
j the
marginal cost of retail product j, and by cr the J × 1 vector of retail marginal costs. The profit
function of hybrid manufacturers contains two terms: the profits from selling the products in the
VSC and the DSC. For the profit of hybrid manufacturers in the DSC, we assume that the marginal
cost is the manufacturer cost plus a retail cost: cmj + c
r
j . Denote by M the market size, by sj(p)
the market share of product j given by equation (7), and by s(p) the J × 1 share vector.32








































31Some of these products may not be offered because some VSC retailers may not carry the products of all
manufacturers. The total number of inside products in our data is 57 and the total number of possible products in
the market is 81.
32We omit the market subscript, t, for the variables in this subsection to simplify the notation.
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where we allow that the manufacturer’s marginal costs to differ depending on whether it is sold to
the consumer or to a VSC retailer (i.e., we allow for crj > 0 for j ∈ Ω
V
m).
Our model allows for economies of scale because a product is a combination of display format,
manufacturer, and retailer and because retailers have different marginal costs; that is, larger retailers
may have lower marginal costs than smaller ones.
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m for hybrid manufacturers.
3.3 Equilibrium
We construct the equilibrium by working backward. The game unfolds in two stages. In the
first stage, manufacturers and VSC retailers bargain over manufacturer prices (i.e., wholesale prices
of display formats), in a Nash bargaining game. The equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium in
Nash bargains. We call this the manufacturer game. In the second stage, VSC and DSC retailers
set retail prices to the consumers, through a Nash Bertrand game. We call this the retail game.
The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect equilibrium (henceforth, equilibrium). We solve for the
equilibrium by backward induction, starting with the retail game. Equilibrium prices are denoted
with asterisks.33
3.4 Stage 2: The Retail Game

































The system of equations (8) defines retail prices implicitly as a function of wholesale prices,
p
∗ = P(ω) by applying the implicit function theorem to (8).
3.5 Stage 1: The Manufacturer Game
Manufacturers and VSC retailers bargain bilaterally and simultaneously over wholesale prices,
ωj , as in Horn and Wolinsky (1988). The equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains:
no manufacturer-retailer pair would like change their agreement given all other agreements.34 Mo-
tivated by our empirical setting, where VSC retailers negotiate with manufacturers each display
format separately, we assume that all manufacturer-retailer pairs negotiate each wholesale price
separately, as in Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010) and Bonnet, Bouamra-Mechemache,
33Retailers do account for the impact of their retail price choices on the wholesale price negotiations. Given any
wholesale prices, retailers independently choose retail prices. At a Nash equilibrium of the second stage game, each
retailer’s strategy is the best response to the rivals’ strategies. Anticipating the equilibrium of the second stage game,
retailers and manufacturers bargain over wholesale prices.
34Each pair of players maximizes the bilateral gains from trade, modeled by an asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution, given the strategies of all others pairs.
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and Molina (2016).35 If the negotiations over ωj fail, manufacturer and retail products j are not
sold. If the negotiations over ωj succeed, the profit of manufacturer m from manufacturer prod-






Msj(P(ω)), and the profit of retailer r from retail product j is
Πrj(ω) =
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Msj(P(ω)). Denote by Πr,−j and Πm,−j the disagreements payoffs of re-
tailer r and manufacturer m, respectively, when they bargain over ωj . Denote by νrmj the bargaining





















Denote by Ωx\ {j}, x = r,m, the set of products that firm x sells without product j. Denote by
ω−j the (J − 1) × 1 vector of manufacturer prices without element ωj . Denote by ∆s
−j
k (P(ω−j))
the change in the market share of product k if product j is not offered. We assume that the dis-
agreement profits for manufacturer m and retailer r when they bargain over ωj are the maximum
profits each could earn if product j were not offered, where the parties assume that other con-
















bargaining game takes place only over products that are sold in the VSC. However, when hybrid
manufacturers bargain with retailers, the Nash product expression includes profits from both the
VSC and DSC because a change in the wholesale price that the parties negotiate also affects sales
in the DSC channel.

























4 Demand: Identification and Estimation
Demand and search-cost parameters enter the purchase probability in different ways. To identify
the price coefficient and the heterogeneity parameters we rely on instruments with the exclusion
restrictions discussed below. We identify the value to consumers of the services provided by the
VSC retailers by using the model and comparing instances where the same combination of display
format and manufacturer is sold by DSC and VSC retailers. We describe a procedure where we
use ratios of searched retailers that do not depend on the demand parameters. Then we show that
certain ratios of Google searches can be used to estimate the ratios of probabilities. We estimate
the demand and search-cost parameters by GMM without using the supply-side model. For the
estimation, we use an adapted version of the procedure proposed by Moraga-González, Sándor, and
Wildenbeest (2015) with the modifications described below.36 We then construct micro moments
using the ratios of Google searches and incorporate them into the GMM objective.
35An alternative assumption, followed by Bonnet, Bouamra-Mechemache, and Molina (2016), is that each pair of
manufacturer-retailer negotiate all their products jointly.
36They provide conditions under which a combination of aggregate and consumer search data can identify these
parameters. Their main insight is to use certain ratios of choice probabilities that do not depend on the search-cost
parameters.
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4.1 Identification of Demand Parameters
We rely on instruments with exclusion restrictions to identify the price coefficient and the het-
erogeneity parameters. Identification of these parameters requires at least one instrument for price
and each heterogeneity parameter.
Price parameter, α. At least one instrument is needed to identify α due to price endogeneity
concerns (e.g., Berry 1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; Nevo 2001). The error term may
be correlated with prices because retailers make their pricing decisions with knowledge about the
valuations of the consumers in each market, conditional on the search step. In our case, the error
term is the unobserved month-specific deviation from the overall mean valuation of the product.
The supply-side model assumes that retailers in the industry observe this deviation. It enters into
the market-specific markup term in the pricing equation, thus introducing a bias in the estimate of
the price sensitivity, α. To address price endogeneity, we use prices of the same product in other
markets as instruments for the price of the product in the current market (e.g., Hausman 1996; Nevo
2001).37 The identifying assumption is that month-specific valuations for a product are independent
across time after accounting for display format, manufacturer, retailer, and months fixed effects.
The prices of the same product are correlated across months due to the common marginal cost. They
are uncorrelated with month-specific valuations due to the exclusion restriction. We use average
retail and average wholesale prices in all months (excluding in both cases the price of the product
in the month being instrumented) and lagged wholesale prices.
Heterogeneity parameters, σν and λ. The parameter σν governs the distribution of the random
coefficients (or heterogeneity in consumer preferences) for price. An instrument is needed to identify
this parameter due to the endogeneity problem arising from the unknown parameter σν interacting
with the endogenous variables, (sjt, pjt). We use a variation of the differentiation instruments
proposed by Gandhi and Houde (2019). We construct instruments defined by a proximity measure
counting the number of competitors located within one standard deviation of product j. We use
the count of other products whose predicted prices lie within five Euros of the own price and the
interaction of this variable with product and manufacturer dummy variables.38
The nested-logit parameter, λ, governs the substitution within and between subgroups of prod-
ucts (or nests) sold by the retailers in the DSC, VSC, and the outside product. An instrument is
needed due to the unknown parameter, λ, interacting with the endogenous within-group share. We
use the number of products in the market within each distribution channel as an instrument. The
identifying assumption is that the error term is uncorrelated with the number of products in the
37In the setting studied, a market is a month and a product is a combination of display format, manufacturer, and
retailer.
38We use predicted prices instead of the potentially endogenous prices as follows. We run a regression of prices on
characteristics and predict prices using the estimated parameters from this regression. Then we use the predicted
prices to count the number of products within the 5-Euro band. Using such predicted prices generates a valid
instrument (even if prices are endogenous) because the characteristics used in the preliminary regression are exogenous.
Such regression generates an unbiased estimate of prices in which shocks are removed. The characteristics included
in the preliminary regression explain over 90 percent of the price variation in the data (adjusted R2 = 0.927). We
have also experimented with a band of ten Euros and obtained similar results.
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market within each distribution channel. The power of the instrument comes from the number of
products in the market within each distribution channel being negatively correlated with the share
of the products within that distribution channel.
Value of VSC Retailers. The identification problem arises due to the non-existence of a coun-
terfactual scenario without the VSC retailers. We evaluate the performance of the market without
the VSC retailers by constructing such a counterfactual scenario using our model and the fact that,
in the outdoor advertising industry, goods can be purchased by the final consumer from either
VSC or DSC retailers. We compare instances where the same combination of display format and
manufacturer is sold by a DSC and a VSC retailer and compute the counterfactual value that the
consumer would have obtained had the purchase been made in a distribution channel different from
the one used. Consider consumer i and suppose that a given combination of display format and
manufacturer is sold by a DSC and a VSC retailer in a given market and that both types of re-
tailers are part of the consideration set of the consumer. The value of a VSC retailer to consumer
i is determined by the extent to which the consumer purchases from a VSC retailer rather than
from a DSC retailer. There are three non-mutually exclusive channels for such consumer decision
according to the model. The first is that the access to quantity discounts by the VSC retailer may
bring its retail prices down relative to where they would have been if those quantity discounts were
not present. The second is that the VSC retailer reduced the search costs to the consumer due
to its access to the display formats of multiple manufacturers (search services). The third is that
the gross utility to the consumer of purchasing from a VSC retailer is larger than the gross utility
of purchasing from a DSC retailer (consulting services). The model decomposes the value of VSC
retailers to consumer i into the three channels by constructing counterfactual scenarios where we
remove each of these channels at a time.
4.2 Identification of Search-Cost Parameters
To identify search-cost parameters we rely on an exogenous variation of product availability
across markets within retailers in the VSC, the search-cost specification in our setting, and avail-
ability of search data with information about ratios of the subset of searched retailers. We show
that the search-cost parameters can be written as a function of the ratios of subset searched retailers
using equation (5). Then, we show under which assumptions one can use the Google-search data to
construct sample analogs of these ratios. Intuitively, if the search costs are high, consumers search
only for the more preferred retailers. Thus, the prices of the products sold by the less preferred
retailers would likely not affect the market shares of the products sold by the more preferred retailers
because the consumers are not aware of possible lower prices from the less preferred retailers. In
contrast, price reductions of less preferred retailers can affect the market shares of most preferred
retailers when search costs are low. In general, consumers have more incentives to search, the larger
is the variance from the distribution of prices of the inside products available in the market, denoted
by F̃p(p) in the model, which is known by the consumers ex ante. Thus, the correlation between
prices of less preferred retailers and market shares of more preferred retailers is larger when this
variance is large.
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We proceed in four steps. First, we present the three assumptions that we use to identify the
search-cost parameters. Second, we present the main identification argument assuming that search
data is available (assumption 3a). Third, we extend the previous argument to the case in our setting
with Google-search data (assumption 3b). In Online Appendix C.4 we discuss the validity of the
assumptions in our empirical setting. See Appendix A for a generalization of the search model
allowing for correlation between the stochastic shocks to the consideration sets of retailers.
We use the following assumptions to identify the search-cost parameters:
Assumption 1 (Exogeneity and Full Support). There is an exogenous variation of product
availability across markets within retailers in the VSC with full support conditional on the other
variables.
Assumption 2 (Search-Cost Specification). Consumers search for retailers but pay a search
cost for each manufacturer sold by the retailer.
Assumption 3a (Search Data). There is availability of search data with the ratios of probabilities
of the searched retailers for any pair of retailers.
Assumption 3b (Google-Search Data). The ratio of Google searches of two retailers converges
in probability to the ratio of consumers who searched the retailers for any pair of retailers such that
the denominator is positive.
Assumption 1 says that the number of products offered by each retailer varies exogenously
across markets. The main restriction from assumption 2 is that consumers search for retailers
but pay a search cost for each manufacturer sold by the retailer. For the estimation, we use
the linear specification of search costs in equation (4).39 There are two alternative versions of
assumption 3. Assumption 3a simply says that there is availability of data about ratios of the
subset of searched retailers. We use assumption 3a to show the economic argument to identify the
search-cost parameters and how the argument can be generalized by relaxing assumptions 1 and
2. Assumption 3b shows how we use readily available Google-search data to identify search-cost
parameters.
We start discussing identification of the search-cost parameters using assumptions 1, 2, and 3a.
Consider a consumer type who bought a given product j ∈ (ĝ∩ Ĵt̃ \{0}) in t̃ ∈ {t, t
′}. Denote by Rt̃
the subset of retailers searched by this consumer in t̃ ∈ {t, t′} and by r̂ the retailer who sold product
j. Choose t such that Rt = {r̂} is singleton and that retailer r̂ has only availability of products
from a single manufacturer. Such choice is always possible due to assumption 1 and observability of
products available in a given market. For example, using the full support variation from assumption
1, pick t such that only the products of retailer r̂ are available and r̂ has only products from the
manufacturer of j. We focus on the case where Rt = {r̂} is singleton to ease the exposition. Recall
from Section 3, that search is costly and consumers know the products available in the market in
39We focus on the linear specification because is the specification used for the estimation in our application. The
linearity of search costs, however, can be relaxed, as we discuss below.
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the search step. The argument can be extended to the case where r̂ is the only retailer in the VSC
channel. In such case, one can use a weaker version of assumption 1: exogenous variation of product
availability across markets within distribution channels with full support conditional on the other
variables. Note that Rt̃ = {r̂} does not imply that the consideration set, Ĵt̃, is singleton, because
r̂ may sell multiple products from the same manufacturer. Similarly, choose t′ such that product
j ∈ (ĝ ∩ Ĵt′ \ {0}) is available, Rt′ = {r̂} is singleton, and that retailer r̂ has availability of products





































dF̃pt′ (p), due to argmaxj∈ĴtUijt|Rti =
argmaxj∈Ĵt′
Uijt′|Rt′i
and (11b) follows from assumption 2 using the search-cost specification in (4). The
key restriction for the last step is that consumers search for VSC retailers but pay search cost for
each manufacturer.
Similarly, by choosing t′′ such that product j ∈ (ĝ∩ Ĵt′′ \{0}) is available, Rt′′ = {r̂} is singleton,










Using assumption 3a, the left hand side in the equations in (11) and (12) is observed. Thus,
these equations jointly identify the search-cost parameters, S̄ and σǫ̃. Assumption 2 and equation
(4) posit linearity for the SC. Such linearity can be generalized by positing, e.g., a polynomial
function. In the case of a polynomial function of degree two with two parameters, one can use a
similar argument as above with an additional ratio of probabilities in t′′′ to jointly identify the two
parameters of the second-degree polynomial function and σǫ̃ using a system of three equations. It is
straightforward to generalize the argument to allow for additional parameters. We suspect that this
argument may also be used to non-parametrically identify the curvature of the search costs under
certain assumptions although we have not proved it.
For the remaining of analysis in this subsection, denote with a hat “̂” variables that are not
function of model parameters (i.e., data). Let Ĝrt be number of google searches for retailer r in t,
M̂rt be the number of consumers who searched for retailer r in t, M̂t be the size of the market, and
P̂rt ≡ M̂rt/M̂t ∈ (0, 1) be the share of consumers who searched for retailer r in t. For the estimation,
we are interested in P̂rt. An identification problem arises because we observe Ĝrt not M̂rt nor the
ratio of probabilities in assumption 3a. We provide conditions under which Ĝrt can be used as proxy
for M̂rt to compute the ratios of probabilities P̂rt.
Denote by Prt, without hat, the prediction of the model for the share of consumers who searched
for retailer r in t. This variable is calculated from the model and is a function of the parameters.
Define the set of consumers who searched for retailer r in t as Art = {(ζigt, εijt, νi, ε̃itRt) : r ∈ Rit},
where Rit is the set of retailers searched by consumer i in t, and ζigt, εijt, νi, and ε̃itRt are defined
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dP (ζigt, εijt, νi, ε̃itRt).
where P (·) denotes the population distribution function.
















Prediction of the model
(13)
where the equality follows from assumption 3b.
Finally, Rt̃, with t̃ ∈ {t, t
′, t′′}, is singleton in equations (11) and (12). With the Google-search
data we proceed in similar form as before. Choose t such that Rt = {r̂} is singleton. For example,
pick t such that the only products available in the market are the products sold by retailer r̂ from a
single manufacturer, the manufacturer of j. Again, the exogeneity and full support variation from
assumption 1 ensures this is always possible. Thus, PRt̃ = Prt̃ and the ratio of Google searches in
(13) can be replaced in the left-hand side in equations (11) and (12), provided Pkt > 0.
See Online Appendix C.4 for a discussion of assumptions 1 to 3.
4.3 Estimation
We estimate the demand model adapting the procedure used by Moraga-González, Sándor, and
Wildenbeest (2015, MSW). The procedure by MSW adapts the nested fixed algorithm used by Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995, BLP) by allowing for an endogenous choice set for each consumer type
i, which is the outcome of the search step. There are four major differences in our procedure relative
to the one by MSW. First, due to our research question, we account for consumers’ preferences for
the two distribution channels. The additional distribution channel introduces the multiplicative
term, Pigt|R′i , to the choice probability in equation (6c), which enters into the market-share equation
(7). Second, we estimate the parameters on the demand side without specifying a functional form
for the supply side, while the estimation in MSW relies on the functional form of a supply equation,
similar to BLP. Third, we use micro moments to identify the search parameters. Finally, the
instruments and identifying assumptions are different due to the previous points.
The model is estimated by GMM and relies on the moment condition E[Z ′ · ω(θ∗)] = 0, where
Z is a matrix of instruments, ω(·) is an error term defined below, and θ∗ = (α, σν , λ,Ψ) is the true







where A is a consistent estimate of E(Z ′ωω′Z) described below.
For each candidate parameter vector, we use equation (7) with the choice probability in equation
(6c) to compute the market shares as a function of the parameters.40 We define the error term as
the unobserved products’ characteristics and compute it by solving for the mean utility level, δjt
that equates:
40The main difference relative to BLP is that the choice probability and, hence, the market share function incor-
porates the search step (this is the last term in equation 6c, denoted by PR′i). Once the market share function is
computed, the estimation procedure resembles BLP.
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sjt(pjt, xjt, δjt;σν , λ,Ψ) = Sjt, (15)
where sjt(·) is the market share function given by equation (7) and Sjt are the observed market shares
obtained from the data. We use a contraction mapping to solve for the implicit system of equations
in (15) and identify the vector of mean utility levels. After solving this system of equations, the
error term is defined as ω ≡ δjt(p, x, S;σν , λ,Ψ)+αpjt. For the estimation, we concentrate the linear
price parameter, α, out of the optimization problem to reduce the dimensionality of the nonlinear
search.
Google Search Micro Moments. For the estimation with Google search micro moments, we
add one additional moment condition defined as follows.41 First, for each retailer r = 1, . . . , R we
compute the difference between the ratio of probabilities across consecutive months predicted by




, where Prt(θ) is
the model’s prediction of the share of consumers who searched for retailer r in t and Ĝrt is the
number of searches for retailer r in t from the Google-search data. We define by Pt(θ) the (R× 1)
row-vector with such differences, one for each retailer. Finally, we define the micro moment as
m(θ∗) ≡ E [Pt(θ
∗)′Pt(θ








We add the moment condition in (16) to the GMM objective in (14) and use the inverse of the
sample variance of the empirical moments as the weighting matrix. We compute the standard errors
for the estimates using the standard procedures (e.g., Hansen 1982, Newey and McFadden 1994),
correcting them to account that the simulation draws are the same for all of the observations in a
market.
5 Supply: Identification and Estimation
5.1 Identification
The parameters from the supply side are the vector of retail marginal costs, cr, the vector of
manufacturer marginal costs, cm, and the vector of bargaining weights, δS . We observe the vector
of retail prices, p∗, the vector of wholesale prices, ω∗, the vector of market shares, s, and size of the
market, M . Using the previously described procedure, we have an estimate of the demand system,
(s(p∗),∇ps, s).
The first-order conditions from the retail game in equation (8) provide a system of J equations
that just identifies the J -vector of retail marginal costs, cr. The first-order conditions from the
manufacturer game in equation (10) also provide a system of J equations. Thus, in general, with-
out additional restrictions, equation (10) cannot be used to identify both, the vector of vector of
manufacturer marginal costs, cm, and bargaining weights, δS , which jointly has dimension 2× J .
We obtain these additional restrictions using the vertical structure in our empirical setting.
Namely, that manufacturers sell the same display format to both, consumers (charging DSC prices)
41See Table A2 in the Online Appendix for a comparison using alternative price beliefs.
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and VSC retailers (charging wholesale prices). A natural set of restrictions justified by this structure
is that the manufacturer marginal cost of a given display format in a given month is the same
whether it is sold to the consumer or to a VSC retailer. In terms of the model, this implies that the
manufacturer marginal costs, cm, could be recovered using the first-order conditions from the retail
game (system in equation 8), without using the first-order conditions from the manufacturer game
(system in equation 10), because the manufacturers are DSC retailers. Therefore, in the first step,
we use the first-order conditions from the retail game in equation (8) to identify the vector of retail
and manufacturer marginal costs using that manufacturer marginal costs are the same for a display
format sold to a VSC retailer and the consumer. In other words, cm is contained in cr. Then,
in the second step, we use the first-order conditions from the manufacturer game in equation (10)
to identify the bargaining weights. The J -vector of bargaining weights, δS , is just identified using
the system in equation (10) conditional on the estimated manufacturer marginal costs, cr, from the
retailer game. Our identification arguments exploit the vertical structure in our empirical setting
and, thus, are different from the ones used previously in the literature (e.g., Draganska, Klapper,
and Villas-Boas 2010; Grennan 2013).42
5.2 Estimation of Marginal Costs and Bargaining weights

















































sijt if j, k are in the same nest g,
αisiktsijt if j, k are in different nests,
where αi > 0.
Applying the envelope theorem and simplifying the first-order conditions from the manufacturer
game in (10), we obtain the following expression used to recover the bargaining weights (see Online
Appendix D):
c






(p∗ − ω∗ − cr) , (18)
42For example, Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010) use observed prices and quantities to estimate demand
parameters. In addition, they have cost data, which they use to estimate marginal costs. Finally, they use the
first-order conditions to estimate the bargaining parameters. Grennan (2013) also uses observed prices and quantities
to estimate demand parameters. However, he does not have cost data and cannot estimate all the bargaining
and marginal cost parameters. Hence, he imposes restrictions on marginal cost parameters and then uses first-order
conditions to estimate bargaining parameters. We use a somewhat different approach. Prior knowledge of the industry
structure allows us to reduce the dimension of the marginal costs parameters (so that manufacturer marginal costs
can be estimated with the retailer marginal costs). Then, we use the first-order conditions from the bargaining game
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is the matrix of shares and changes in shares in Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010, p. 62,
first matrix) with ∆s−jk ≡ s
−j
k (P(ω))− sk(P(ω)) denoting the difference between the market share
of product k if product j is offered and if it is not and δS is the vector of bargaining weights defined
above.
We parameterize the manufacturers’ marginal costs, cmjt , as:






t + ǫ̂jt, (19)






t capture marginal cost for display format d, manufacturer
m, and month of the year t, using fixed dummy variables for display format, manufacturer, and
monthly seasonal effects in market t, respectively; and ǫ̂jt is an unobservable error term. Denote by







Rearranging terms, write the supply unobservable error term as:













(p∗ − ω∗ − cr) . (20)
For the estimation, we assume that the unobservable determinants of costs are i.i.d across
products, j and markets, t. We set the retailers’ marginal cost to zero, crjt = 0 ∀ (j, t). We believe
these are sensible assumptions in our empirical setting for two reasons. First, because manufacturers
and retailers’ marginal costs are quite low in this industry and vary little across markets (Table 7
discussed in next section). Second, because our interest in the supply-side parameters is as inputs
for counterfactual scenarios without intermediaries’ services in Subsection 7.2.43 We perform the
estimation by choosing the value of the parameters, (γ, cr, δS), that minimize the sum of squared
errors given by equation (20), subject to the demand estimates, cmjt ∈ [0, pmjt], c
r





Table 5 displays estimates from the following specifications of the model. (1) A simple logit model
(without random coefficients for the price, without channel-specific preferences, without search). (2)
A mixed logit model (without channel-specific preferences and without search). (3) A mixed logit
model with channel-specific preferences (without search). (4) A mixed logit model with channel-
specific preferences and with costly search. The latter specification corresponds to the full model
described Subsection 3.1. Model 4 uses the additional Google micro moments implemented using
equation (16). All the specifications include a set of dummy variables for manufacturers, retailers,










is the true value of the supply parameters. We have also performed the estimation using an expression analog to
equation (19) for retailers’ marginal costs with no unobservable determinants and obtained retailers’ marginal costs
that were very close to zero.
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display formats, and months fixed effects. The instruments used in the GMM specifications are
described in Subsection 4.
We apply the estimation procedure from Subsection 4 with the obvious modifications. For
example, for the simple logit, model 1, the error term in the system of equations (15) has a closed-
form expression, the search step in Section 3 is skipped, and the model is estimated by OLS. For
models 2 and 3, we solve for the error term using the contraction mapping and skip the search step.
The demand estimates do not impose the equilibrium conditions from the supply side.
The estimated parameters have the expected signs and are sensible in magnitude. Three con-
clusions emerge from this table. First, by comparing the estimates from models 1 and 2, one can
see the role of accounting for price endogeneity and unobserved price heterogeneity. The estimated
mean price coefficient in model 2 is three times higher in absolute terms than the one in model 1
(0.168/0.050). The coefficient for the standard deviation of the random coefficients for the price is sta-
tistically different from zero. Consumer heterogeneity is important in this industry. Not accounting
for these features may bias the estimated absolute-value mean price elasticity downwards.
Second, by comparing the estimates from models 2 and 3, one can see the role of accounting for
preference heterogeneity for the distribution channels. Model 3 allows for such preference hetero-
geneity. The null hypothesis that there is no preference heterogeneity for the distribution channels,
λ̂ = 0, is rejected. Model 2 precludes correlation in consumer preferences for the products in the
same distribution channel. In model 3, consumers self-select into the distribution channels based
on their preferences. They are less responsive (lower α in absolute value) and more homogeneous
(lower σν) in their taste for price for products in the same channel, relative to model 2. Overall,
these results indicate that ignoring channel-specific preferences may overestimate price sensitivity
and price heterogeneity.
Finally, by comparing the estimates from models 3 and 4, one can see the role of accounting
for consumer search. The search-cost parameters, S̄ and σε̃, are precisely estimated. The estimate
of the search-cost parameter, S̄, implies that the cost of searching one additional retailer is 1.54
Euros on average (0.182/0.118). This search cost represents 8 percent of the mean price paid by
consumers across all display formats in the setting (1.54/19.64, where 19.64 Euros is the mean price
of all display formats across both distribution channels in Table 3). For 2 m2 panels, the most
popular product in the industry, with 56 percent of the sales, the cost of searching one additional
retailer represents 12 percent of the mean price (1.54/13.09). The estimate of the scale parameter of the
consideration sets, σε̃, is about 9 times smaller than the scale parameter of the utility function shock,
which is normalized to 1 (1/0.116). This result indicates that unobserved factors affecting consumer
choice of the consideration sets, although statistically different from zero, play a relatively small
role in the empirical setting studied. The estimated search-cost parameters imply that consumers
search, on average, for 5.8 retailers to collect information about their prices, pjt, and the realization
of their random shocks, ε̂ijt, associated with their products. In other words, consumers sample
approximately 60 percent of the subset of all retailers available in the market when performing their
search (5.77/9 = 0.64). This finding indicates that the restriction to consumers’ consideration sets
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is substantial due to search costs: around 40 percent of the overall retailers do not belong to the
consideration set of a given consumer.
Next, compare the price sensitivity of the models with and without search. Table 6 presents
the consumer-level, own-price elasticities. The last column shows the ratio of elasticities computed
from the model without search (model 3) relative to the elasticity of the model with search (model
4). For the median elasticity, the ratio is 0.5. Consumers are more sensitive to price in model 4
with search. These results are consistent with prior findings in Draganska and Klapper (2011) and
De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest (2012). They indicate that ignoring consumer search (i.e.,
incorrectly assuming that consumers have full information), may bias the estimated absolute-value
price elasticities downwards. The explanation is simple, as emphasized by De los Santos, Hortaçsu,
and Wildenbeest (2012, p. 2977): “[...] the price changes we—as econometricians—observe in the
data are not observed by consumers who sample only a subset of the stores. A full information [...]
model assumes that all prices are observed, thus ascribing unresponsiveness to price changes to low
price elasticity.” Finally, compare the ratio of elasticities between DSC and VSC retailers. For DSC
retailers, the ratio ranges between 0.5 and 0.8; for VSC retailers, it ranges between 0.2 and 0.7. In
other words, the bias is larger for VSC retailers. By allowing consumers to have access to multiple
manufacturers, VSC retailers decrease consumer search costs relative to DSC retailers. Ignoring
search generates a greater bias in the estimated price elasticities of VSC retailers than the ones
of DSC retailers because VSC retailers provide better search services. These demand elasticities
are important by themselves, as they directly translate into price-cost margins and affect merger
simulations.44
The demand estimates in Table 5 and the elasticities in Table 6 show that consumer search
plays a relatively large role in the empirical setting studied. By facilitating search, intermediaries
increase consumer welfare, a result that will be reflected in the counterfactual analysis.
6.2 Supply Estimates
Table 7, Panel A displays the estimates of selected parameters of the manufacturers’ marginal
cost from equation (19). Panel B displays summary statistics of the distribution of manufacturers’
marginal costs. Panel C displays the mean bargaining weights.
The estimated parameters are sensible in magnitude. Two patterns stand out. First, panel B
shows that manufacturers’ marginal costs are relatively low in this industry, consistent with expert
industry reports as in, e.g., U.K. Office of Fair Trading (2011). For example, for 2 m2 panels,
the median wholesale price is 8.34 Euros per square meter (Table 2) and the median estimated
marginal cost is 1.30 Euros per square meter (0.877 + 0.431). Marginal costs vary little across
firms, display formats, and markets. The coefficient of variation is 0.4 (0.353/0.872). Second, panel
C shows that the VSC retailers have relatively low bargaining power, 0.24 on average, compared to
44Our estimates imply that the price-cost margins computed from the model without search are substantially lower
than those computed from the model with search (50 percent or more) with a greater bias for VSC retailers. Estimates
from a model without search tend to underestimate the effects of a merger because they tend to underestimate the
substitution among products. The bias is greater for mergers encompassing VSC retailers that provide better search
services.
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the bargaining power of the manufacturers, 0.76 on average. These numbers are consistent with the
large concentration at the manufacturer level and the low retail margins in the empirical setting.
The largest manufacturer, m2, has nearly 50 percent of the sales. VSC retailers have little bargaining
power when negotiating with manufacturer m2. Retail margins for the VSC retailers are low. The
median (mean) margin of the VSC retailers is 0.57 (1.72) Euros per square meter.45
We use the supply-side parameters to simulate the counterfactual scenarios in Subsection 7.2.
6.3 Robustness
We performed several robustness tests of our model. First, in Table 5 we performed the estima-
tion of the demand model using different specifications, where we build up the full demand model
starting from a simple logit model. We also tested different specifications of the supply model, as
discussed in footnote 43. Second, we tested for different information structures for the specifica-
tion of the empirical distributions of prices, F̃p(p), in Table A2 in the Online Appendix, discussed
in footnote 28. Third, in unreported results, we tested for different specifications of the Google
search micro moments using ratios of probabilities of different retailers in a given market (instead
of ratios of probabilities of the same retailer in different markets as implemented in Table 5) and
using the same specifications of the micro moment as in Table 5 but with the different definitions
of Google searches in Online Appendix B.2.2. Fourth, also in unreported results, we estimated
the model using different instruments (using a different definition of the differentiation instruments
as discussed in footnote 38, using wholesale prices or lagged wholesale prices to address price en-
dogeneity, and using interactions of the latter variables with product availability in the previous
months). Sixth, we tested for different functional form specifications of the search cost in the de-
mand model (e.g., using an exponential function) and the counterfactual (see Section 7). Seventh,
we tested increasing/decreasing the market size (to, respectively, 50 and 10 percent greater than
the maximum observed total monthly sales). Finally, we tested using different nonlinear program-
ming solvers, starting values, number of simulated consumers, and seeds to control the generation
of random numbers. The estimated parameters did vary sometimes across some of these robustness
































45The estimated bargaining weights also show that direct-to-consumer sales increase the bargaining power of man-
ufacturers when negotiating with retailers. In this paper, our main focus is the demand side. We use the supply
model to compute the counterfactual prices to investigate the welfare effects to consumers of the services provided
by the intermediaries. See Donna, Pereira, Trindade, and Yoshida (2021) for a supply-side investigation about the
impact of direct-to-consumer sales on the bargaining power of the manufacturers and the implications for vertical
mergers.
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where E(·) denotes the expectation operator taken over both random shocks ε̂ijt and ε̃ijRi , the
inclusive value, IĝRi , is given in Online Appendix C.3, and C is a constant.
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Consumer welfare for type i is defined as the change in the consumer surplus, or compensating
variation, CV , that results from a change in the services offered by the retailers. We compute the
difference between the consumer surplus before and after such change. We consider four changes
in the services offered by the retailers that described in Subsection 7.2. We compute the total
consumer surplus calculated as the weighted sum of E(CSi) using the weights reflecting the number










where E(CV ) denotes the weighted sum across types of consumers of the compensating variation,
the superscripts 0 and 1 refer, respectively, to before and after the counterfactual change in the
services offered by the retailers, and E(CSi) is given by equation (21).
7.2 Counterfactual Scenarios
Three channels through which VSC retailers affect consumers’ welfare are by providing consult-
ing, search, and purchase-aggregation services. We consider three counterfactual scenarios where
we turn off each of these channels and an additional one where we turn off all three simultaneously.
For each counterfactual scenario we compute the compensating variation using equation (22).
For each scenario, we follow the following three steps. First, we compute the optimal prices by
solving the system of retail and bargaining equations using the initial matrix of elasticities. Second,
we use the vector of prices from the supply side to form the consumer’s price expectations. We do
this step by taking multiple draws with replacement from the optimal price vector and integrating
them numerically. This step guarantees that the price expectations are rational. Finally, we solve
the consumer-demand problem using the price expectations.
No Consulting Services. In this scenario, consumers may use the VSC but VSC retailers do
not offer consulting services, defined as the gross utility of a given display format from the retailer.
In Subsection 3.1, the gross utility of the consumer of purchasing a display format from a given
manufacturer differed according to whether it was purchased through the VSC or DSC. We define the
difference in gross utilities between the VSC and DSC retailers as the consulting services provided
by the VSC retailers.
We implement this counterfactual by imposing that the gross utility of consuming a display for-
mat from a given manufacturer (purchased through the VSC) to be the gross utility of consuming
the same display format of the same manufacturer purchased through the DSC. According to equa-
tion (1), the gross utility for display format d, produced by manufacturer m, and sold by retailer r,








t . The no-consulting-service scenario, denoted
with the superscript c1, is implemented by changing each component of the vector that corresponds
46The constant indicates that the absolute level of utility cannot be measured.
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to purchases made trough the VSC, such that: τ c1dmrt = τdmmt, for every m, r and t.
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No Search Services. In this scenario, consumers may use the VSC but VSC retailers do not
offer search services. According to our model, VSC retailers reduce consumers’ cost of searching.
We implement this counterfactual by increasing the search cost of consumers as follows. In equation
(4), consumers pay S̄ for each manufacturer sold by the searched retailer. In this counterfactual,
consumers pay S̄ for each retailer-manufacturer combination carried by the retailer searched.48
This counterfactual leaves constant the number of “stores” and display formats. It only eliminates
the search-cost advantage of buying through a retailer instead of a manufacturer. We then simulate
the choice outcomes predicted by the demand model.
No Purchase-Aggregation Services. In this scenario, we recompute the equilibrium prices
using the supply side. According to the model, the initial observed prices were set following, first,
the bargaining game and, then, the retail (or Nash Bertrand) game. In this counterfactual, we use
the estimated supply parameters to remove the purchase-aggregation services by recomputing prices
assuming that they are generated by two successive Nash Bertrand. We follow the following four
steps. First, we compute the optimal retail-price function (as a function of any wholesale price)
given by equation (8). Second, we use the result from step 1 to solve numerically for the pass-
through matrix defined by ∂pk/∂ωr for all k, r, similar to equation (9) in Villas-Boas (2007, p. 634).
Third, we solve for the optimal wholesale prices in the two-margin model using equation (10) with
νrmj = 0 and step 2 to get ∇ws ≡ ∂s/∂ω
′ = ∂s/∂p× ∂p/∂ω. Finally, we solve for the optimal wholesale
prices, ω, using equation (10) from step 3, which is similar to equation (9) in Draganska, Klapper,
and Villas-Boas (2010, p. 62). This procedure gives an expression that is a function of ω and p
that can be solved for ω using the implicit function theorem applied to (10) because p∗ = P(ω).
We then use the new price vector and the estimated demand system to recompute the purchase
decisions of the consumers.
No Intermediaries’ Services. In this scenario, both VSC and DSC retailers operate but VSC
retailers do not offer either consulting, search, nor purchase-aggregation services, as defined above.
We implement it by simulating a new counterfactual where implement the three previous counter-
factuals simultaneously. To evaluate the welfare under the different scenarios we simulate the choice
outcomes predicted by the demand model.
7.3 Counterfactual Results
Table 8 reports the results from the counterfactual scenarios above. Columns 1 to 4 compare
the results relative to the baseline predictions (model 4 in Table 5 labeled as baseline). We report
the following outcome variables: the inside share (fraction of the market with purchases of inside
47The value τdmrt represents the gross utility of a display format d, produced by manufacturer m, and sold to
consumers by retailer r. In this counterfactual scenario, that product has the gross utility of a display format d,
produced by manufacturer m, and sold to consumers by manufacturer m (i.e., a DSC retailer), τdmmt.
48For example, if the VSC retailer carries products of only 1=one manufacturer, consumers’ search costs do not
change in the counterfactual. If the VSC retailer carries products of two (three) manufacturers, consumers’ search
costs increase by S̄ (2S̄). With this specification, the resulting increase in search costs is small. The key insight of
this counterfactual is that search costs increase without VSC retailers.
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products), DSC as fraction of inside (fraction of inside purchases made through the DSC), mean
posted prices, mean paid prices (mean posted prices weighted by the quantities purchased), number
of retailers searched, count paid of search costs (number of times that a search cost was paid), and
the total change in the consumer surplus.
In column 1 we remove the consulting-service differential between the VSC and the DSC. We
observe a small decrease in the total purchases. There is an increase in the sales fraction from the
DSC. The number of searched retailers exhibits little variation. This finding is consistent with the
search costs not being affected in this counterfactual. The total consumer surplus decreases by one
Euro per square meter. These results reflect the estimated demand system, which shows a larger
gross utility for purchases in the VSC. It is consistent with intermediaries providing additional
services besides the advertising space, such as assistance with the advertising design and brand
recognition for intermediaries.
In column 2 we remove intermediaries’ search services. The cost of searching increases for
consumers. There is a decrease in the amount purchased of inside products. The increase in search
costs decreases the number of retailers searched by 5 percent (5.47/5.77 − 1). The overall cost of
the search increases substantially, by 35 percent (7.79/5.77− 1), even when the overall level of prices
is similar to the baseline. That is, removing the intermediaries’ search-cost advantage results in
consumers paying substantially higher search costs: now consumers pay the search cost for each
retailer-manufacturer combination carried by the searched retailer relative to paying such cost for
each manufacturer sold by the searched retailer. Although the increase in the search cost decreases
the number of searched retailers, the total amount spent on searching increases. In sum, consumers
search less, pay more search costs, buy less inside products, and pay similar prices relative to the
benchmark. The consequence is a large decrease in the total consumer surplus, 12 Euros per square
meter. This number is 33 percent higher than the mean paid price in the baseline (11.6/8.73−1). These
outcomes reflect the estimates of the search parameters in the demand system. Search frictions are
substantial. Intermediaries reduce them by providing consumers access to the display formats of
multiple manufacturers. The removal of the intermediaries’ search advantage generates a decrease
in the consumer surplus comparable to a large increase in the market power.
In column 3 we remove the intermediaries’ purchase-aggregation services. Wholesale prices paid
by the VSC retailers increase due to the elimination of the intermediaries’ bargaining power, thus
partially transferring the increase to the consumers. Prices to the consumers increase by 42 percent
(11.81/8.29 − 1). This increase reflects the rise of VSC prices. DSC prices decrease. The increase
in relative VSC prices induces consumers to substitute away from the intermediaries to the DSC
retailers. It also generates a decrease in the amount purchased of inside products. These two effects
mitigate the large increase in VSC prices. As a consequence, total consumer surplus decreases only
two Euros per square meter.
In column 4 we simultaneously remove all services provided by the VSC retailers. There is a
relatively large increase in prices, 45 percent on average (12.03/8.29−1). This increase is driven by the
rise in DSC prices due to the removal of the purchase-aggregation services of the VSC retailers. On
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the one hand, higher prices induce consumers to search more and to substitute to the DSC retailers,
as in column 3. On the other, the higher search costs induce them to search less and to pay more
search costs, as in column 2. Column 4 shows that the net effect is a decrease in the number of
searched retailers and an increase in the fraction of DSC purchases by 53 percent (28.0/18.2 − 1).
There is also a decrease in the total purchases of inside products by 12 percent (62.0/76.6 − 1).
The consumer surplus decreases by a large amount, 14 Euros per square meter.49 The decrease
in the consumer surplus is 64 percent higher than the mean paid price in the baseline (14.28/8.73 −
1). The decrease in the consumer surplus can be decomposed in terms of the contribution of the
services provided by the intermediaries. The consulting services explain approximately 7 percent
of the raw decrease in the consumer surplus in column 4 (−0.93/−14.28), while the search services
explain approximately 81 percent (−11.58/−14.28), and the purchase-aggregation services explain the
remaining 12 percent (−1.77/−14.28). In other words, providing search services is the most prominent
mechanism for intermediaries’ welfare enhancement in the empirical setting studied, followed by
purchase-aggregation and consulting services. We interpret the welfare results from column 4 as
the impact that VSC retailers have on consumer welfare, holding constant the market structure.
In column 4 we remove the three channels through which the VSC retailers (intermediaries) affect
consumers’ welfare without affecting the downstream level of competition or the vertical structure
in the marketplace: VSC and DSC retailers continue to operate but VSC retailers do not offer
consulting, search, nor purchase-aggregation services.50
8 Concluding Remarks
We proposed an empirical framework to quantify the welfare effects due to intermediation. We
employ structural econometric techniques in demand and supply estimation to isolate the channels
through which intermediaries affect welfare. We apply our empirical framework to the outdoor
advertising industry, recover the primitives of the industry, and simulate counterfactual scenarios to
quantify the welfare of the services offered by the retailers. The presence of intermediaries increases
the welfare in this industry. The value of their services outweighs the additional margin charged.
Our model combines features that are typical of a vertical industry. These features include con-
sumers who have unobserved preferences that are specific to the distribution channel and engage in
costly search on the demand side, and two layers of activity—where manufacturers and intermedi-
aries bargain over wholesale prices—with two distribution channels—that compete on downstream
prices—on the supply side. The empirical setting studied, outdoor advertising, looks similar to
other vertical markets in several dimensions. Recent examples in the U.S. include disputes between
49The change in the consumer surplus in column 4 does not correspond to the sum of the changes in consumer
surpluses in columns 1, 2, and 3. The difference is due to interactions between these effects in the counterfactual in
column 4, as explained in this paragraph.
50See Donna, Pereira, Trindade, and Yoshida (2021) for an investigation of the impact of direct-to-consumer sales
on welfare and the implications for market power and merger evaluation.
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Tesla and Automobile Dealer Association, and the proposed merger between Aetna and CVS.51
Our framework may be used to evaluate the implications of vertical mergers when intermediaries,
or retailers, offer additional services relative to the ones of the manufacturers.
Two main conclusions arise from our analysis. First, the presence of intermediaries increases
welfare. This finding is not surprising because consumers made 85 percent of the purchases through
the intermediaries in the setting studied. However, similar canals to the ones analyzed here may be
present in other industries and sectors, where the counterfactual scenario without intermediaries may
not be observable; that is, where consumers do not buy directly from the manufacturers. Measuring
the welfare of intermediaries for merger evaluation, for example, may also require quantifying the
value of the services provided by the intermediaries to consumers. In such cases, our framework
may provide new insights for regulators, competition authorities, and antitrust agencies. Ignoring
the retailers’ search-cost advantage or the resulting increase in final prices due to the removal of the
retailers’ bargaining advantage may generate effects comparable to a large increase in the market
power with significant consequences for horizontal- and vertical-merger evaluation. Second, we find
that the three services considered provide value to consumers, with search playing a prominent role.
This finding is, no doubt, specific to the empirical setting investigated. However, our approach
shows the importance of specifying a flexible model that may allow for such quantification. It
is well known that vertical integration often eliminates double marginalization and may generate
efficiencies gains.52 Our analysis complements such literature. It helps to explain why intermediaries
are ubiquitous in modern economies despite the double marginalization, a subject that has received
little empirical work.
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Appendix
A Search Model with Correlated Consideration Sets of Retailers
We extend the search model to allow for unobserved search-cost heterogeneity. We generalize the search model in
step 1 by allowing correlation between the stochastic shocks to the consideration sets of retailers, Ri. The idiosyncratic
unobserved search costs may be correlated between the consideration sets of DSC and VSC retailers. For instance,
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2}. In the baseline search model, the idiosyncratic shocks to the consideration sets are




i . We now extend the baseline model to allow for correlation between the shocks
to Ri and R
′
i; that is, between the shocks to the consideration sets of retailers in the same distribution channel.
We allow consumers to have search-costs shocks that are specific to consideration sets of retailers in the same
distribution channel and consideration sets with retailers in both distribution channels and the no-search option. We
capture this correlation by decomposing the stochastic term, ε̃itRi in equation (3) using the distributional assumptions
of the nested logit. It is straightforward to extend the approach using other distributions. For example, one can also
obtained closed-form solutions for the search probabilities using the generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution.
Let ϑ ∈ {0, 1, 2} define three groups (or nests) of nonoverlapping consideration set of retailers for: (i) consideration
sets with retailers in both distribution channels and the no-search option denoted by ϑ = 0 (henceforth, mixed
consideration sets), (ii) consideration sets with retailers in the DSC denoted by ϑ = 1 (henceforth, DSC consideration
sets), and (iii) consideration sets with retailers in the VSC denoted by ϑ = 2 (henceforth, VSC consideration sets).
Let κ be a nesting parameter, such that 0 ≤ κ < 1. A larger value of κ corresponds to a greater correlation in
idiosyncratic search costs for consideration sets in DSC, VSC, and mixed consideration sets. A larger value of κ
is therefore associated with less search for consideration sets in DSC, VSC, and mixed consideration sets. When
κ = 0 the search model collapses to the baseline search model with no search-cost heterogeneity for consideration
sets of retailers. Consumer i chooses the subset of searched retailers, Ri, that maximizes the expected net benefit of
searching, VtRi . The probability that consumer i finds optimal to sample the subset of retailers R̂i in market t, PR̂i






























i = 1, . . . , It, R̂i ∈ ϑ̂, ϑ̂ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, t = 1, . . . , T,
where the derivation is similar as the one in in Online Appendix C.



































































































i = 1, . . . , It, j ∈ Jt, g ∈ {0, 1, 2}, ϑ ∈ {0, 1, 2} t = 1, . . . , T,
where Λ is the powerset of all retailers and we followed the same derivation as in equation (6) with PR′i given by
equation (23). Then, equation (24) can be replaced in the market share function (7).
Allowing for the unobserved search-cost heterogeneity discussed in this subsection adds an additional search
parameter to the estimation routine, κ. The demand nesting parameter, λ, and the search nesting parameter, κ,
enter the unconditional choice probability, Pijt in equation (24), in different ways through the net indirect utility,
U ijt, and the net expected value of searching, V tRi , respectively. Under assumptions 1, 2, and 3b in Subsection 4.2,
the parameter κ is identified using an additional ratio of probabilities in t′′′ yielding to a system of three equations
in S̄, σǫ̃, and κ.
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Table 1: Sales Percentage to Consumers by Manufacturer, Retailer, and Product.
Panel A: Sales to Consumers by Manufacturer and Retailer (as percentage of total sales)
Manufacturer
TotalSeller m1 m2 m3 m4
VSC Retailers
rv4 1.06 2.34 0.63 2.34 6.36
rv5 0.54 1.24 0.66 0.96 3.41
rv6 3.31 5.35 1.26 5.32 15.25
rv7 1.43 4.61 1.68 13.53 21.25
rv8 0.18 1.36 0.37 – 1.91
rv9 6.97 23.86 5.86 0.30 37.00
DSC Retailers
rd1 1.51 – – – 1.51
rd2 – 8.79 – – 8.79
rd3 – – 4.52 – 4.52
Total 15.01 47.56 14.98 22.45 100.00
Panel B: Sales to Consumers by Manufacturer, Retailer, and Display Type (as percentage of total sales)
Seller
2 m2 panel Senior Other
Total 3 Total 4
m1 m2 m3 m4 m1 m2 m3 m4 m1 m2 m3 m4
VSC Retailers
rv4 1.06 0.94 0.24 – – 1.40 0.10 – – – 0.29 2.34 6.36
85.18
rv5 0.54 1.10 0.28 – – 0.14 0.22 0.17 – – 0.16 0.79 3.41
rv6 3.31 3.20 0.97 1.39 – 2.15 0.19 – – – 0.10 3.93 15.25
rv7 1.43 3.42 0.68 0.28 – 1.06 0.45 – – 0.13 0.55 13.25 21.25
rv8 0.18 0.22 – – – 1.10 0.16 – – 0.04 0.21 – 1.91
rv9 6.93 17.55 3.79 0.10 0.03 5.82 0.53 0.15 0.01 0.49 1.55 0.06 37.01
DSC Retailers
rd1 1.51 – – – – – – – – – – – 1.51
14.83rd2 – 5.10 – – – 3.49 – – – 0.21 – – 8.80
rd3 – – 1.61 – – – 0.21 – – – 2.70 – 4.52
Total 1 14.97 31.54 7.56 1.77 0.03 15.17 1.86 0.32 0.01 0.87 5.56 20.36 100
Total 2 55.84 17.37 26.80 100
Notes: Each cell in Panels A and B corresponds to the percentage of sales to consumers (relative to the total sales’ volume to consumers sold in year 2013 in the whole
sample) by the corresponding combination of: (1) Manufacturer and Seller in Panel A and (2) Manufacturer, Seller, and Display Format in Panel B. Thus, in each panel, all
the numbers sum to 100 (excluding the rows and columns labeled as “Total”). A cell displays the symbol “–” when no sales are observed for such combination. In Panel B,
there are a total of 57 cells with positive sales (i.e without the symbol “–’), that corresponds to the 57 inside products (see footnote 16). In panel B, “Total 1” refers to the
total sum by manufacturer mi, i = 1, . . . , 4, “Total 2” refers to the total by display format (2 m
2 panel, Senior, and Other), “Total 3” refers to the total sum by retailer rvj ,
j = 4, . . . , 9 and rdj , j = 1, 2, 3, “Total 4” refers to the total by VSC Retailers (i.e., sum over r
v
j , j = 1, . . . , 6) and by DSC Retailers (i.e., sum over r
d
j , j = 1, 2, 3). “DSC”
stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands for Vertical Sales Channel. See Figure 1 for definitions of prices and vertical relations in the industry.
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Table 2: Wholesale and Retail Prices in the VSC.
Panel A: All Manufacturers and All VSC Retailers
Display Format
Wholesale Price VSC Price (Retail Price)
Median Mean SD Min Max Median Mean SD Min Max
2 m2 panel 8.34 12.05 12.75 0.81 93.38 9.05 13.14 13.94 0.86 99.39
Senior 12.93 17.23 18.21 0.81 158.06 13.71 18.30 19.46 0.83 165.80
Other 24.79 28.67 26.07 0.34 148.60 27.04 31.76 29.52 0.37 171.99
Panel B: By Manufacturer and All VSC Retailers
Display Manu- Wholesale Price VSC Price (Retail Price)
Format facturer Median Mean SD Min Max Median Mean SD Min Max
2 m2 panel
m1 8.11 9.39 7.35 1.42 51.64 8.75 10.61 8.26 1.50 56.18
m2 10.50 11.99 9.52 2.33 64.80 11.31 13.06 11.33 2.41 83.22
m3 6.26 8.64 11.74 1.04 79.45 6.79 9.40 12.73 1.09 81.52
m4 12.38 19.80 18.88 0.81 93.38 13.29 21.10 20.22 0.86 99.39
Senior
m1 16.09 14.95 4.39 9.07 24.13 16.78 15.67 4.49 9.46 25.17
m2 6.27 10.77 14.22 0.81 98.39 6.42 11.12 14.59 0.83 100.57
m3 9.01 21.76 27.55 2.09 158.06 10.06 23.95 29.69 2.17 165.80
m4 18.71 21.07 10.25 6.11 46.45 19.40 22.03 10.85 6.49 53.85
Other
m1 48.69 42.41 24.94 3.61 83.26 52.58 48.05 29.76 5.09 106.60
m2 34.39 37.18 17.99 0.34 117.09 37.97 39.31 18.77 0.37 120.03
m3 12.98 28.50 33.93 0.45 148.60 14.66 32.55 39.33 0.64 171.99
m4 13.48 15.44 14.73 0.38 57.28 14.44 17.59 16.88 0.41 66.93
Notes: Panel A reports summary statistics of wholesale and VSC prices (i.e., retail prices) for each display format (2 m2
panel, Senior, and Other) across manufacturers (m1, m2, m3, and m4) and VSC retailers (rv4 , r
v
5 , . . . , r
v
9 ), respectively. Panel
B reports summary statistics of wholesale and VSC prices across all VSC retailers for each combination of display format and
manufacturer. See Table A1 in the Online Appendix for a comparison of summary statistics of wholesale and VSC prices by
manufacturer and by VSC retailer for the display format 2 m2 panel. “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands
for Vertical Sales Channel. See Figure 1 for definitions of prices and vertical relations in the industry.
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Table 3: Price Paid by Consumers to in the DSC and VSC.
Panel A: By Display Format, All Manufacturers
Display Sales
Median Mean SD Min MaxFormat Channel
2 m2 panel
DSC 10.16 12.79 12.29 1.67 66.90
VSC 9.05 13.14 13.94 0.86 99.39
Senior
DSC 13.61 13.38 4.54 6.30 22.98
VSC 13.71 18.30 19.46 0.83 165.80
Other
DSC 9.15 14.81 16.36 1.36 63.62
VSC 27.04 31.76 29.52 0.37 171.99
Panel B: By Display Format and by Manufacturer
Display Manu- Sales
Median Mean SD Min MaxFormat facturer Channel
2 m2 panel
m1
DSC 11.71 12.28 2.88 9.19 19.04
VSC 8.75 10.61 8.26 1.50 56.18
m2
DSC 14.71 19.41 19.07 1.67 66.90
VSC 11.31 13.06 11.33 2.41 83.22
m3
DSC 6.85 6.64 2.23 2.67 10.16
VSC 6.79 9.40 12.73 1.09 81.52
Senior
m1
DSC 14.64 14.61 2.65 11.84 19.04
VSC 16.78 15.67 4.49 9.46 25.17
m2
DSC 14.68 14.56 3.93 7.87 21.31
VSC 6.42 11.12 14.59 0.83 100.57
m3
DSC 9.80 11.32 5.52 6.30 22.98
VSC 10.06 23.95 29.69 2.17 165.80
Other
m2
DSC 15.84 22.89 20.57 1.36 63.62
VSC 37.97 39.31 18.77 0.37 120.03
m3
DSC 5.46 7.31 4.36 1.87 16.58
VSC 14.66 32.55 39.33 0.64 171.99
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the price paid by consumers on sales made in the DSC and in the VSC (column labeled “Sale’s
Channel”). Panel A reports the summary statistics by display format (2 m2 panel, Senior, and Other). DSC prices refer to the prices over all sales
from manufacturers to consumers in that display format. VSC prices refer to the prices over all sales from retailers that are not manufacturers
for that display format. Panel B reports the summary statistics by display format and by the manufacturer. DSC prices in Panel B refer to
the manufacturer in each cell ( i.e., there is only one manufacturer in each of these cells). VSC prices refer to the prices over all sales from
retailers that are not manufacturers for the display format and manufacturer in the relevant cell. Manufacturer m4, that corresponds to the
additional manufacturer that aggregates smaller manufacturers, is not included because it does not perform any sale to the consumers directly
(i.e., manufacturer m4 does not participate in the DSC). Similarly, manufacturer m1 is not included for the display format “Other” because it
does not perform any sale to the consumers directly. “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands for Vertical Sales Channel. See Figure
1 for definitions of prices and vertical relations in the industry. 41
Table 4: Quantity Discounts in the VSC but not in the DSC.
Price paid by consumers per m2 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(m2) -7.0708*** -1.8348 -6.9948*** -1.5502
(0.4472) (1.2105) (0.4511) (1.1810)
Log(m2) × VSC -6.0297*** -6.2510***
(1.2990) (1.2576)
Manufacturers Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Retailers Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Display Formats Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Months Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.4081 0.4291 0.4493 0.4723
Number of Observations 570 570 570 570
Notes: All regressions are OLS specifications. The sample is the same sample used for the structural estimation. It
corresponds to all purchases of all display formats made by the consumers in the industry. The dependent variable
is the price paid by consumers per square meter of advertising in a given month, labeled as “Price paid by consumers
per m2.” The variable “Log(m2)” corresponds to the total square meters of advertising purchased by consumers in
that month on a logarithmic scale. The variable “VSC” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the consumer performed
the purchase through a VSC retailer and 0 if the consumer performed the purchase through the DSC retailer. “DSC”
stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands for Vertical Sales Channel. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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Table 5: Demand Estimates.
Logit Mixed logit
Mixed logit with Mixed logit with
channel-specific preferences channel-specific preferences and
costly search
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error
Price:
- Mean (α) 0.050 (0.001) 0.168 (0.004) 0.057 (0.001) 0.118 (0.002)
- St. dev. (σν) 0.071 (5.8e-05) 0.024 (0.007) 0.057 (0.002)
Firm dummy variables:
- Manufacturer 1 -0.672 (0.117) -0.416 (0.198) -0.142 (0.076) -0.275 (0.134)
- Manufacturer 2 0.930 (0.103) 1.005 (0.169) 0.336 (0.065) 0.609 (0.115)
- Manufacturer 3 -0.382 (0.096) -0.493 (0.162) -0.147 (0.062) -0.338 (0.110)
- Retailer 1 0.193 (0.257) 0.459 (0.437) -0.683 (0.168) 0.063 (0.297)
- Retailer 2 -0.659 (0.117) -0.836 (0.196) -0.262 (0.075) 0.008 (0.133)
- Retailer 3 -0.909 (0.107) -0.541 (0.181) -0.224 (0.069) 0.314 (0.123)
- Retailer 4 2.728 (0.119) 0.128 (0.267) -0.784 (0.103) -0.291 (0.182)
- Retailer 5 -0.424 (0.113) -0.874 (0.186) -0.257 (0.072) -0.106 (0.126)
- Retailer 6 0.242 (0.161) 0.129 (0.272) -0.877 (0.105) -0.228 (0.185)
- Retailer 7 -0.505 (0.109) -0.494 (0.179) -0.164 (0.069) -0.360 (0.121)
- Retailer 8 -1.867 (0.118) -1.603 (0.203) -0.456 (0.078) -0.525 (0.138)
Product dummy variables:
- 2 m2 panel 0.911 (0.085) 0.336 (0.143) 0.156 (0.055) 0.270 (0.097)
- Senior -0.652 (0.086) -0.848 (0.145) -0.194 (0.056) -0.406 (0.099)
Channel-specific preferences:
- Nesting parameter (λ) 0.495 (0.002) 0.373 (0.025)
Search parameters:
- Search cost (S̄) 0.182 (0.021)
- Scale of ε̃ (σε̃) 0.116 (0.023)
Model specification:
- OLS Yes No No No
- GMM No Yes Yes Yes
- Random coefficients for price No Yes Yes Yes
- Channel-specific preferences No No Yes Yes
- Costly search No No No Yes
- Google search micro moments No No No Yes
Value of GMM Objective: – 26.762 4.800 29.375
Number of observations: 570 570 570 570
Notes: Estimates of selected parameters from the structural demand model. All specifications include dummy variables for manufacturers, retailers, display format, and months fixed effects. The model
with search uses the following information structure for F̃p(p): consumers know two distributions of prices, the distribution of prices for the DSC retailers and the distribution of prices for the VSC
retailers (see footnote 16). See Subsection 2.2 for details about the data used in the estimation. A description of the demand model is in Subsection 4. Details about the estimation procedure are in
Subsection 3.1. See Subsection 6.1 for details about the specifications of the models in the different panels. The Google search micro moment is implemented using equation 16. See Subsection 4.2 for
details. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table 6: Consumer-Level Own-Price Elasticities.
Break-out Statistic








Panel A: All retailers, manufacturers, display formats, and markets
All pooled
25th Percentile -3.49 -11.08 0.31
50th Percentile -1.04 -2.12 0.49
75th Percentile -0.35 -0.87 0.40




- rd2 -0.81 -1.62 0.50
- rd3 -1.80 -3.56 0.51




- rv5 -0.51 -1.10 0.46
- rv6 -0.84 -1.22 0.68
- rv7 -1.04 -2.25 0.46
- rv8 -2.66 -12.77 0.21
- rv9 -1.28 -3.31 0.39




- m2 -1.13 -1.76 0.64
- m3 -0.83 -2.08 0.40
- m4 -1.58 -3.53 0.45
Notes: Consumer-level, own-price elasticities from the structural model. Models 3 (mixed logit with channel-specific
preferences) and 4 (mixed logit with channel-specific preferences and costly search) correspond to models 3 and 4
in Table 5, respectively. The table presents the consumer-level, own-price elasticities across all display formats and
markets disaggregated by type of retailer or manufacturer. The elasticities for all models and panels are the percent
change in market share of the product j with a 1 percent change in the price of product j. Panel A displays 25th, 50th,
and 75th percentiles of the elasticities across all manufacturers, VSC and DSC retailers, display formats, and markets.
Panel B displays 50th percentile of the elasticities for the DSC retailers across all manufacturers, display formats, and
markets. Panel C displays 50th percentile of the elasticities for the VSC retailers across all manufacturers, display
formats, and markets. Panel D displays 50th percentile of the elasticities by manufacturer across all VSC and DSC
retailers, display formats, and markets. The last column shows the ratio of elasticities computed from the model
without search (model 3) relative to the elasticity of the model with search (model 4). “DSC” stands for Direct Sales
Channel. “VSC” stands for Vertical Sales Channel.
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Table 7: Supply Estimates.
Estimate
Panel A: Marginal costs estimates
Manufacturers:
- Constant (γ0) 0.383
- 2 m2 panel 0.431
- Senior 0.127
- Manufacturer 1 0.604
- Manufacturer 2 0.508
- Manufacturer 3 0.063
Retailers:
- Constant 0






Panel C: Bargaining weight estimates (mean)
Bargaining weight retailers (ν̄rmj) 0.240
Bargaining weight manufacturers (1-ν̄rmj) 0.760
δ̄Srmj 0.806
Notes: Estimates of selected parameters from the structural supply model. The supply estimates use the estimated
demand model 4 from Table 5. A description of the supply model is in Subsection 3.2. Details about the estimation
procedure for the supply model are in Subsection 5. See Subsection 6.2 for details about the estimates. The estimates
in panel C refer to the mean (across retailers, manufacturers, and display formats) of the variables as defined in
subsections 3.2 and 6.2 and are denoted with upper bars.
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Table 8: Counterfactual Results.
Outcome variables Baseline
Intermediaries do not provide:
Consulting Search Purchase- Consulting, search, nor
services services aggregation purchase-aggregation
services services
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inside share (percentage) 70.63 69.61 67.45 65.33 61.98
DSC sales as a fraction of inside sales (percentage) 18.25 19.91 18.31 25.92 28.01
Mean posted price (Euros per square meter) 8.29 8.47 8.28 11.81 12.03
Mean paid price (Euros per square meter) 8.73 8.71 8.73 10.98 11.01
Number of retailers searched 5.77 5.79 5.47 5.74 5.50
Count of search costs 5.77 5.79 7.79 5.74 7.77
Change in consumer surplus (Euros per square meter) – -0.95 -11.60 -1.79 -14.28
Notes: Counterfactual results using model 4 from Table 5 and the supply estimates from Table 7. The row labeled “Inside share” reports the fraction of the total
potential size of the market that resulted in purchases of the inside products. The row labeled “DSC as fraction of inside” reports the fraction of those purchases
of the inside products made through the Direct Sales Channel (DSC). The row labeled “Mean posted price” reports the mean price posted for the inside products.
The row labeled “Mean paid price” reports the mean price weighted by the quantity purchased. The row labeled “Number of retailers searched” reports the
mean number of retailers searched by the consumers (both in the DSC and VSC). The last row labeled “Change in consumer surplus” reports the change in the
total consumer surplus of each column, relative to the baseline, computed using the weighted sum across types of consumers of the compensating variation using
equation 22. The column labeled “Baseline” reports the previous measures for the baseline model 5 from Table 5. Columns 1 to 4 reports the previous measures
for each of the counterfactual scenarios defined in Subsection 7.2. In column 4, the change in consumer surplus is computed by simulating simultaneously the
counterfactuals in columns 1, 2, and 3, which is not equivalent to the sum of the change in consumer surpluses in these columns. See Section 7 for details.
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Figure 1: The Portuguese Outdoor Advertising Industry.
Notes: The figure displays the vertical relations in the Portuguese outdoor advertising industry. “DSC” stands for Direct Sales
Channel. “VSC” stands for Vertical Sales Channel. The manufacturers (m1, . . . ,m4) sell their products to the VSC retailers
(rv4 , . . . , r
v
9 ) charging wholesale prices. The VSC retailers sell to consumers, charging VSC prices (or retail prices). The three
main manufacturers (m1,m2,m3) also sell directly to the consumers through the DSC. This feature is captured in the diagram




3), which correspond to the large manufacturers charging a DSC prices to the consumers.
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Figure 2: Market Shares, Total Volume, and Prices by Month.
Market Shares and Total Volume
Prices
Notes: The top panel displays the distribution of market shares and total volume by month. The left vertical axis shows the
distribution of market shares each month, distinguishing the sales to consumers in the VSC and DSC. The right vertical axis
shows the total sales volume from each month (horizontal series) distinguishing the sales to consumers in the VSC and DSC.
The bottom panel displays the distribution of prices (per square meter) each month, distinguishing the sales to consumers in
the VSC and DSC. Each vertical box displays the 95th percentile (upper whisker), 75th percentile (upper hinge), median (black
circle marker), 25th percentile (lower hinge), and 5th percentile (lower whisker). The maximum market share by month are as
follows (the first number refers to the sales on the VSC and the second number refers to the sales in the DSC): January (0.188,
0.029), February (0.028, 0.061), March (0.218, 0.052), April (0.024, 0.020), May (0.142, 0.050), June (0.032, 0.037) July (0.164,
0.037), August (0.016, 0.034), September (0.139, 0.033), October (0.066, 0.077), November (0.139, 0.035), December (0.038,
0.047). “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands for Vertical Sales Channel. See Figure 1 for definitions of prices
and vertical relations in the industry.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Coefficient of Variation.
Density Estimate
Empirical CDF
Notes: The figure displays the kernel density estimate (top panel) and empirical cumulative distribution (bottom panel) of coefficient of variation
of prices (CV) for sales to consumers in the VSC and DSC, conditional on quantity discounts. To perform the estimation we proceed in three
steps. First, we define the unit of analysis as a tuple (Display Format,Month,Volume Percentile), where “Display Format” are the display formats
as defined in Subsection 2.1, “Month” are the months of the year, and “Volume Percentile” are the percentiles in the volume variable that account
for quantity discounts. Second, for each unit of analysis ( i.e. tuple as defined above) we compute the CV (i.e., the variation of prices is
within tuple). Third, we estimate the kernel density and empirical cumulative distribution as follows. Let cv denote realized CV in each tuple










, where K (z) is a standard univariate gaussian kernel function, h is the bandwidth that we choose by cross
validation, and cv(j) , j = 1, . . . , J are the CV in each tuple. Given that the price distribution has its domain bounded we use a renormalization
method to deal with the boundaries when estimating the probability density function of CV. We estimate the empirical cumulative distribution of




j=1 1 {cv(j) ≤ cv}, where 1 {A} is the indicator function of the event A. “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel.
“VSC” stands for Vertical Sales Channel. See Figure 1 for definitions of prices and vertical relations in the industry.49
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B Additional Details Regarding the Industry, Data, and
Analysis
B.1 Additional Description of the Industry
Differentiation. Retailers sell advertising space and other services, such as consulting. Dis-
play formats from a given, specific manufacturer sold through different retailers are differen-
tiated products. Manufacturers are not necessarily present at the same locations at all times.
They do not have identical networks. Manufacturers also offer differentiated products. Finally,
some combinations of display formats, manufacturers, and retailers may not be available at a
given time. Consumers ought to consider not only the attributes of the advertising space they
require but also the characteristics of the retailers and manufacturers when searching among
retailers and manufacturers.
Payment Schedules. Contracts and payment schedules between manufacturers and VSC re-
tailers are negotiated because all participants in the industry are firms. Manufacturers charge
a price schedule that consists of a linear price and quantity discounts as a function of the total
sales. Consumers’ purchases in the DSC exhibit no quantity discounts (Table 4 in the article).
However, when consumers purchase in the VSC, the quantity discounts that VSC retailers ob-
tain from manufacturers are partially transferred to the consumers. Payment schedules between
(VSC or DSC) retailers and consumers are posted prices from the consumers’ perspective.
Productive Capacity. In the short run, the productive capacity of each manufacturer and,
thus, of the industry is fixed. The capacity is measured by the installed equipment available
for outdoor advertising. To operate, manufacturers must first obtain the right to use the space
where the display equipment is installed, either through a public tender or direct contracting.
This right is obtained from the site owners, which are the landlords of the physical space
where the display equipment is installed. Site owners include transit authorities, airports,
supermarkets, malls, and other public/private landlords. The rights between manufacturers
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and site owners are set by long-run contracts that last up to 20 years. We focus on the year
2013. The productive capacity is therefore fixed. Inspection of our data on manufacturers’
installed capacity and monthly usage indicates that capacity limits are never attained in our
sample for any of the manufacturers. That is, manufacturers always operate below capacity.
Market Concentration. The Portuguese outdoor advertising market is quite concentrated
both at the manufacturer and retail levels. At the manufacturer level there are three large
national firms, m1, m2, and m3. They are responsible of 77.6 percent of the sales in the market
(Panel A in Table 1 in the article). The other small local manufacturers are responsible of the
reminder of the sales. Manufacturer m2 is the largest manufacturer with 47.6 percent of the
sales. At the retail level, the five largest VSC retailers, retailers rv
4
, . . . , r
v
8
, are responsible of 48.2
percent of the sales. Retailer rv
7
is the largest retailer with 21.2 percent of the sales. It is larger
than the DSC retailers. The most popular display format are 2 m2 panels. They encompass
55.8 percent of the sales (Panel B in Table 1 in the article). The largest manufacturer, m2, is
responsible of 56.5 percent of the sales of 2 m2 panels in the market (31.5/55.8). The largest VSC
retailer, rv
7
, is responsible of 10.4 percent of the sales of 2 m2 panels ((1.4+3.4+0.7+0.3)/55.8). There
is no cross-ownership between manufacturers, nor between retailers, nor between manufacturers
and retailers.
B.2 Additional Description of the Data
B.2.1 Procedures to Collect and Clean the Main Data
The data were collected directly from the VSC retailers and manufacturers. The information
collected from the VSC retailers includes, for each product and each month of the year 2013:
the sales values, the quantity sold in the number of advertising faces and m2, the cost of the
products transacted, the commissions, fees, and quantity discounts received and paid.
Retailer data are complemented with information of direct sales of manufacturers (i.e., sales
of manufacturers to consumers) and sales of manufacturers to VSC retailers other than the 5
main VSC retailers. This information was obtained from a survey to the 3 main manufacturers,
J.C. Decaux, Cemusa, and Mop, and includes the same information previously described for
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the VSC retailers.
We exclude observations with a ratio of median absolute deviation (MAD) of m2 sold in
natural logarithm (logs) to the standard deviation larger than 3 (11 observations dropped),1
with a ratio of MAD of wholesale price in logs to the standard deviation larger than 3 (12
observations dropped), with a ratio of MAD of the retail price in logs to standard deviation
larger than 3 (6 observations dropped), panels sold in airports (9 observations dropped).2 We
further aggregate all monthly sales through groups that are not the ones that we surveyed in a
single product (54 observations collapsed).
B.2.2 Google-Search Data
We use Google-search data to generate micro moments used to identify the search param-
eters on the demand side. The Google-search data were obtained directly from Google Trends
Portugal from the link below, and accessed on August 30, 2017:
https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=2013-01-01%202013-12-31&geo=PT
The raw Google-search data correspond to weekly searches for the period under study in
Google Portugal (https://www.google.pt/) of the names of the retailers spelled as follows:
cemusa, havas, ipg, jcdecaux, mop, omnicom, pmg, and wpp. These retailers correspond,
respectively, to the following retailers in the data: Cemusa, Havas, Megameios, JCDecaux,
Mop, Opusopera, Powermedia, and Group M. For robustness, we performed the search in
Google Portugal for each of these retailers with the names spelled as above. In all cases, the
first result displayed by Google Portugal was the webpage of the retailer. We use these raw
data to generate the variables defined next. For the micro moments in Section 6 in the article,
we use the mean weekly searches for the previous 3 months.
1The median and standard deviation are always specific to each display format.
2Panels at airports are typically negotiated on a case-by-case basis and are substantially more expensive.
A-4
Google-Search Variables Definitions
- Mean weekly searches previous month. Mean per month of weakly searches using the
previous month.
- Mean weekly searches previous 3 months. Mean per month of weakly searches using
the mean over the previous 3 months.
- Mean weekly searches previous 6 months. Mean per month of weakly searches using
the mean over the previous 6 months.
- Mean weekly searches moving average. Mean per month of weakly searches using a
three-period moving average.
- Total searches previous month. Total searches per month using the previous month.
- Total searches previous 3 months. Total searches per month using the mean of the
previous 3 months.
- Total searches previous 6 months. Total searches per month using the mean of the
previous 6 months.
- Total searches moving average. Total searches per month using a three-period moving
average.
The idea behind the variables using moving averages is to capture an adaptive expectation
of the searches based on information on these lags. That is, they are a proxy for what could
consumers forecast for the current visibility of a retailer based on the past values, using the
fixed weighting scheme determined by the moving average.
The measures of price dispersion and Google searches are positively correlated. The pairwise
correlation between the level of Google searches and the level of retail prices is 0.2805. The
coefficient of a regression of the level of retail prices on the level on Google searches plus fixed
effects is 0.184, statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level (similarly for the next
coefficients). Using the standard deviation (for both retail prices and Google searches), the
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pairwise correlation and regression coefficients are 0.320 and 0.344, respectively. Using the
coefficient of variation (for both retail prices and Google searches), the pairwise correlation and
regression coefficients are 0.161 and 0.077, respectively.
We interpret the Google searches as a proxy for the visibility of the retailer not necessarily as
a proxy for price dispersion itself nor a reduced-form measure of the observed price dispersion.
Of course, price levels and price dispersion are determined by the extent of search frictions in
the market and, in particular, retailer visibility, as explained in Section 4 in the article. The
reported reduced-form measures can be thought of as an approximate measure of the level of
frictions in the marketplace.
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B.2.3 Additional Summary Statistics
Table A1: Wholesale and Retail Prices in the VSC: By Manufacturer and by VSC Retailer,
Display Format: 2 m2 panel.
Manu- VSC Wholesale Price VSC Price (Retail Price)
































































































30.91 31.17 23.52 9.94 93.38 33.10 33.42 24.67 11.91 99.39
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of wholesale and VSC prices (i.e., retail prices) in the VSC for






, . . . , r
v
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) across months of the year. This table corresponds to Table 2, Panel B, sub-panel 2 m2 panel in
the article, disaggregated by retailer that is not manufacturer. “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC”
stands for Vertical Sales Channel. See Figure 1 in the article for definitions of prices and vertical relations in
the industry.
A-7
B.3 Additional Preliminary Analysis
B.3.1 Seasonalities and Monthly Variation
Market Shares and Quantities. The top panel in Figure 2 in the article shows monthly
seasonal variations in total volume and market shares within the month. The top panel shows
the total volume sold each month (right vertical axis) distinguishing the sales to consumers
in the VSC and DSC. The total volume purchased in the Portuguese advertising industry in-
creases during the summer. Total volume varies substantially by month, reflecting the monthly
variation in the purchases made in the VSC. The figure also shows the distribution of products’
market shares (left vertical axis) for each month distinguishing sales to consumers in the VSC
and DSC. There is a large variation in market shares both in the VSC and DSC.
Seasonal variations in the Portuguese advertising industry have two main components. First,
a deterministic component, whereby the demand for advertising increases during certain months
of the year (e.g., summer vacation). Second, a non-deterministic component, whereby individual
firms make specific advertising decisions on certain months of the year based on their needs
(firms launching a new product in September, advertising in December before Christmas, etc.).
The deterministic component explains the increase in advertising during the summer. The
non-deterministic component explains the monthly volatility.
Differentiation in the application studied primarily arises due to the location of the display
formats. A given manufacturer provides formats to one VSC retailer in one location and other
VSC retailers in a different location. The locations are ex ante unknown to the consumers.
They vary from month to month due to the availability of the formats in the manufacturers’
network.
Prices. The bottom panel in Figure 2 in the article shows that the within monthly variation
in prices is larger than the variation across months. The bottom panel displays the distribution
of prices paid by consumers each month distinguishing sales to consumers in the VSC and DSC.
The distribution of prices of sales made in the VSC is more disperse than the one in the DSC. It
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is due to the presence of quantity discounts on the sales made in the VSC that are not present
in the DSC (table 4 in the article). Conditional on quantity discounts, the distribution of prices
of sales made in the VSC is less disperse as discussed in the paper.
B.3.2 Price Dispersion and Returns to Consumer Search
One can also measure the variation in prices across identical goods sold by the same re-
tailer holding constant the manufacturer, the month of the year (seasonal effects), and the
volume percentile (quantity discounts). We cannot hold constant, however, both the retailer-
manufacturer and the month of the year due to the nature of our data. We do not observe the
individual transactions of the consumers, only the total transactions per month per product
and per retailer-manufacturer. Figure 3 in the article measures price dispersion across retailers
holding constant the display format, the month of the year, and the volume percentile (quan-
tity discounts). Figure A1 below measures price dispersion across months holding constant the
display format, the manufacturer, the retailer, and the volume percentile. Similar results are
obtained.
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Figure A1: Distribution of Coefficient of Variation.
Density Estimate
Empirical CDF
Notes: The figure displays the kernel density estimate (top panel) and empirical cumulative distribution (bottom panel) of coefficient of variation of
prices (CV) for sales made to consumers through retailers and manufacturers, conditional on quantity discounts. To perform the estimation we proceed
in three steps. First, we define the unit of analysis as a tuple (Display Format,Manufacturer, Retailer,Volume Percentile), where “Display format” are
the display formats as defined in Subsection 2.1 in the article, “ Manufacturer” are the manufacturers of the product (M1, . . . ,M4), “Retailer” are the
VSC retailers (rv4 , . . . , r
v






3 ), and “Volume Percentile” are the percentiles in the volume variable (to account for quantity
discounts). Second, for each unit of analysis (i.e., tuple as defined above) we compute the CV (i.e., the variation of prices is within tuple). Third, we
estimate the kernel density and empirical cumulative distribution as follows. Let cv denote realized CV in each tuple j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. We estimate the










K (z) is a standard univariate gaussian kernel function, h is the bandwidth that we choose by cross validation, and cv(j) , j = 1, . . . , J are the CV in
each tuple. Given that the price distribution has its domain bounded we use a renormalization method to deal with the boundaries when estimating




j=1 1 {cv(j) ≤ cv}, where
1 {A} is the indicator function of the event A. “DSC” stands for Direct Sales Channel. “VSC” stands for Vertical Sales Channel. See Figure 1 in the
article for definitions of prices and vertical relations in the industry.
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C Random-Coefficient Nested-Logit Model with Search
In this appendix, we compute the choice probabilities, maximum expected value, and welfare
for the nested-logit random-coefficient model with search. To facilitate the reading we repeat
the notation of the model in Subsection C.1.
C.1 Notation Overview
The indirect utility of consumer i for inside product j in market t conditional on the set of
retailers searched, Ri, is:








t + ξjt + ε̂ijt,
i = 1, . . . , It, j ∈ ĴtRi = {ĵ : ĵ ∈ Jt is sold by retailer r ∈ Ri} ∪ {0}, t = 1, . . . , T,
where Ri denotes the subset of retailers searched; ĴtRi is the consideration set of consumer i,
given by the subset of products sold by all the searched retailers and the outside product; pjt is
the price of product j in market t; xjt is a S-dimensional row vector of observable characteristics




r , and τ
D
t capture the preferences for display format
d, manufacturer m, retailer r, and monthly seasonal effects in market t, using fixed dummy
variables for display format, manufacturer, retailer, and monthly seasonal effects, respectively;
ξjt is the valuation of unobserved by the econometrician characteristics of product j in market
t; ε̂ijt = ζigt + (1 − λ)εijt, is a stochastic term; g ∈ {0, 1, 2} define three groups (or nests)
of nonoverlapping products for the outside product (denoted g = 0 with only one product),
the products sold by the DSC retailers (denoted g = 1), and the products sold by the VSC
retailers (denoted g = 2); ζigt has a unique distribution such that ε̂ijt is extreme value; λ
is a nesting parameter such that 0 ≤ λ < 1; αi = α + σννi, νi ∼ Pν(νi) = N (0, 1), are
individual-specific parameters that capture consumers’ preferences for price; and β is a S-
dimensional vector of parameters. In each market t, we normalize the characteristics of the







= τDt = ξ0t = 0 for all t. Denote
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Then U ijt = δjt − σννipjt.
C.2 Choice Probabilities
The probability that consumer i chooses product ĵ in group ĝ conditional on the searched


































































































































= Piĝt|Ri × Piĵt|ĝRi , (C.1c)
i = 1, . . . , It, ĵ ∈ (ĝ ∩ ĴtRi), ĝ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, t = 1, . . . , T,
where:





















and where the first equality in (C.1a) follows from the nested-logit choice probability (e.g.,
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McFadden 1978, equation 18); the equality in (C.1b) follows from replacing the definitions of
the inclusive values, IiĝRi and IĝRi , given by equations (C.2a) and (C.2b), respectively;
3 and
where Piĝt|Ri is the marginal conditional probability of choosing a product in group ĝ given
that the product is in the consideration set ĴtRi , and Piĵt|ĝRi is the conditional probability of
choosing product ĵ given that the product is in group ĝ and in the consideration set ĴtRi .
C.3 Maximum Expected Value
Following McFadden (1978),4 the expected maximum utility conditional on the set of re-

























where E(·) is the expectation operator taken over ε̂ijt; log(·) denotes the natural logarithm
function; and γ̂ = 0.5772 is the Euler’s constant.
Denote by IĝRi the inclusive value of the set of products from the searched retailers that
belong to subset ĝ excluding the outside product:
IĝRi ≡ (1− λ) log
∑
j∈(ĝ∩ĴtRi\{0})
eU ijt/(1−λ), ĝ ∈ {1, 2}. (C.3)
3As before, E(·) is the expectation operator taken over the i.i.d. shocks within group ĝ; the equation (C.2a)
follows from the maximum expected value of the logit model (i.e., within group ĝ) (see, e.g., footnote 5); and
equation (C.2b) follows because the inclusive value of the outside product is equal to zero.
4Corollary to theorem 1 on pages 82-3, equations (14) and (17).































































where the last equality follows because the inclusive value of the outside product is equal to
zero.
















dFp(p) + γ̂ − SCRi + ε̃itRi ,
where SCRi is the cost of searching the subset of retailers Ri; ε̃itRi is a random shock to the
subset of searched retailers that is drawn i.i.d. from a type I extreme value distribution with
location parameter µε̃ = 0 and scale parameter σε̃ > 0; and the last equality follows from
equation (C.4) with the inclusive value, IĝRi , defined by equation (C.3).
C.4 Additional Discussion about Identification of Search-Cost Pa-
rameters
Assumptions 1 to 3 in the article merit further discussion. The main hypothesis in as-
sumption 1 is that product availability varies exogenously within retailers across markets. This
hypothesis is necessary for identification. It is non-testable. We believe it is reasonable in our
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empirical setting for two reasons. First, manufacturers have limited capacity. Thus, it is not
unusual for a given VSC retailer not to have availability of a particular display format from a
given manufacturer based on past sales, even if the manufacturer’s capacity limit is not reached
because the manufacturer may have additional formats to sell directly to consumers or through
other VSC retailers. Second, because we observe substantial empirical variation across markets
in the number of products available within retailers in the VSC. Such variation occurs because
a given manufacturer sells display formats to multiple VSC retailers and to consumers. As-
sumption 1 also presumes full support variation, which is seldom observed in the data. For the
estimation in Subsection 4.3 in the article, we propose using several differences of ratios for each
retailer across months to incorporate variation in product availability. We compute, for each
retailer, the difference between the ratio of probabilities across consecutive months predicted by
the model and the Google search measure observed in the data. There is a reasonable variation
in these differences for a given retailer across months in the setting studied. We believe that
the observed empirical variation is sensible given our linear specification. With a larger number
of periods/markets, one may be able to obtain information about the curvature of the search
costs.
The key restriction for assumption 2 is that consumers search for VSC retailers but pay
search costs for the product of each manufacturer sold by the VSC retailer. We interpret it
as the consumers interacting with the different managers within the VSC retailer, who are
responsible for the display formats of different manufacturers. If a consumer wants to collect
information about the prices of the display formats of the manufacturers carried by the retailer,
the consumer needs to contact the various managers. It is a reasonable practice in the outdoor
advertising industry studied.
The main insight about using Google searches in assumption 3b is that they capture the
visibility of retailers and manufacturers. We do not posit that the search cost is the cost of
a Google-search click. If a consumer decides to search for a retailer, then the consumer may
Google search such retailer with a certain probability to, e.g., find the retailer’s email, phone
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number, address, etc. The consumer incurs the actual search cost by gathering such information.
For example, by scheduling/having a meeting or sending several emails, the consumer incurs a
search cost and learns about the retailer’s offerings (e.g., prices, locations of the billboard, etc.).
One way to rationalize assumption 3b is to assume that the total number of Google searches,
Ĝrt, and the number of consumers who searched for retailer r, M̂rt, are related as follows:
Ĝrt = κM̂rt + Ξrt, (C.5)
where κ is a scalar, and Ξrt denote mean zero random variables that are i.i.d. across r and t.
With this interpretation, there are two main assumptions in equation (C.5). The first is
that Ξrt are i.i.d. across retailers and markets (periods). This assumption would be violated if a
significant number of consumers would search more for Ĝ1t than Ĝ2t because, for example, the
name of retailer r1 coincides (or is similar) to other search queries unrelated to r1. This effect
would confound the Google search for retailer r1 with the unrelated search query. For example,
in an English-speaking country, Google searches for the retailer “Mop” may be confounded
with Google searches for the article for cleaning floors. For Google searches in Portugal during
the period under analysis, we did not find any confounding searches for any of the names of
the retailers. We find that, for all retailers and manufacturers, the first result displayed by
Google Portugal was the webpage of the corresponding retailer/manufacturer, after performing
a search query in Google Portugal with the name of the retailer/manufacturer used to construct
the variable.6 Consumers who performed such searches in Google Portugal are predominantly
searching for information about the retailers. We interpret this fact as evidence that these
confounding factors do not play a major role in our setting. The second is that the scalar
κ is the same across retailers. This assumption would be violated if, for example, consumers
would search for retailer r1 distinctively more online than for retailer r2, relative to non-online
searches (e.g., Yellow-page searches). There are no substantial differences across retailers in
6We believe this is a sufficient condition to argue that confounding factors do not bias the Google searches
used for the estimation. See Appendix B.2.2 for details about the Google-search data and the names of the
retailers.
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online searches by consumers in the setting studied. Google searches are a good proxy for
searches in our setting because our data include all meaningful transactions in the industry and
consumers search for these retailers/manufacturers predominantly online. For these reasons,
we believe that the specification in equation (C.5) is sensible in our empirical setting.
C.5 Welfare Measures
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where the expectation in the first line is taken over both random shocks, ε̂ijt and ε̃ijRi ; the third
equality follows by computing the maximum expected utility over the shocks ε̂ijt using equation
(C.4) with the inclusive value, IĝRi , defined by equation (C.3); the fourth equality follows by
computing the maximum expected utility over the shocks ε̃itRi (e.g., Ben-Akiva and Lerman
1985, p. 105) with σε̃ being the scale parameter of these shocks; and C1 and C2 are constants.
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D Details About the Supply
D.1 Derivation of the Estimating Equation for the Bargaining Weights.
In this subsection, we compute the equations that we use for the estimation in the supply
side. We derive the first-order necessary conditions from the bargaining problem and transform
them into an expression that we use to recover the bargaining weights.
















































































































































Now look at the components in equation (D.4), namely, the difference between the profits


















































where ∆s−jk ≡ s
−j
k (P(ω))− sk(P(ω)) denotes the difference between the market share of prod-
uct k if product j is offered and if it is not. This expression corresponds to equation (9) in
Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010, p. 62). In our case, does not has closed-form
solution. It corresponds to the proportion of the market share of product j that is allocated
to the other products carried by the retailer or manufacturer. Similarly, for the difference in
retail profits, an expression analog to the one in (D.5) is obtained.
Next, replace expression (D.5) and its analog for the the difference in retail profits into (D.4)
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(p∗ − ω∗ − cr) = 0,
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(p∗ − ω∗ − cr) . (D.8)
We use expression (D.8) for the estimation of the supply side.
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E Robustness Analysis: Demand Estimates using Alternative Price Beliefs
Table A2: Demand Estimates using Alternative Price Beliefs.
Baseline Less Information More information
Mixed logit with Mixed logit with Mixed logit with
channel-specific preferences and channel-specific preferences and channel-specific preferences and
costly search costly search costly search
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error
Price:
- Mean (α) 0.118 (0.002) 0.095 (0.002) 0.100 (0.002)
- St. dev. (σν) 0.057 (0.002) 0.043 (0.001) 0.046 (0.008)
Firm dummy variables:
- Manufacturer 1 -0.275 (0.134) -0.245 (0.130) -0.263 (0.126)
- Manufacturer 2 0.609 (0.115) 0.575 (0.110) 0.604 (0.107)
- Manufacturer 3 -0.338 (0.110) -0.274 (0.106) -0.300 (0.103)
- Retailer 1 0.063 (0.297) -0.184 (0.286) -0.044 (0.278)
- Retailer 2 0.008 (0.133) -0.082 (0.128) -0.130 (0.124)
- Retailer 3 0.314 (0.123) 0.244 (0.118) -0.038 (0.115)
- Retailer 4 -0.291 (0.182) -0.390 (0.175) -0.276 (0.170)
- Retailer 5 -0.106 (0.126) -0.190 (0.122) -0.147 (0.118)
- Retailer 6 -0.228 (0.185) -0.367 (0.178) -0.202 (0.173)
- Retailer 7 -0.360 (0.121) -0.154 (0.117) 0.013 (0.114)
- Retailer 8 -0.525 (0.138) -0.470 (0.133) -0.546 (0.129)
Product dummy variables:
- 2 m2 panel 0.270 (0.097) 0.230 (0.093) 0.241 (0.091)
- Senior -0.406 (0.099) -0.413 (0.095) -0.442 (0.092)
Channel-specific preferences:
- Nesting parameter (λ) 0.373 (0.025) 0.409 (0.007) 0.375 (0.017)
Search parameters:
- Search cost (S̄) 0.182 (0.021) 0.051 (0.013) 0.087 (0.107)
- Scale of ε̃ (σε̃) 0.116 (0.023) 0.115 (0.005) 0.113 (0.022)
Model specification:
- OLS No No No
- GMM Yes Yes Yes
- Random coefficients for price Yes Yes Yes
- Channel-specific preferences Yes Yes Yes
- Search Yes Yes Yes
- Google search micro moments Yes Yes Yes
Price Information Structure:
- Consumers’ beliefs Two distributions: One distribution: 57 distributions:
about prices prices in VSC and DSC with all prices prices by product
Value of GMM Objective: 29.375 30.927 32.552
Number of observations: 570 570 570
Notes: Estimates of selected parameters from the structural demand model. All specifications include dummy variables for manufacturers, retailers, display format, and months fixed effects. Model 1 is
the same as model 4 in Table 5 in the article and is presented to facilitate the comparison. Information structure for F̃p(p) in model 1: consumers know two distributions of prices, the distribution of
prices for the VSC retailers and the distribution of prices for the DSC retailers. Information structure for F̃p(p) in model 2: consumers only know one distribution with the prices for all the products in
the market. Information structure for F̃p(p) in model 3: consumers know 57 distributions of prices, corresponding to the 57 inside products in the sample. See Subsection 2.2 in the article, and footnotes
16 and 28 in the article for details. See Subsection 2.2 in the article for details about the data used in the estimation. A description of the demand model is in Subsection 4 in the article. Details about
the estimation procedure are in Subsection 3.1 in the article. The Google search micro moment is implemented using equation 16 in the article; see Subsection 4.2 in the article for details. Standard
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